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[11f the people don't like [certain judicial interpretations of a statute], Con-
gress can change them if only it gets around to doing so. But f the people
don't like Miranda, Congress can do nothing except promote an amendment
to the Constitution. -Henry Friendly (1967)1
t This Article was the basis for the Frank Irvine Lecture for 2000 delivered at the
Cornell Law School on March 15, 2000.
tt Visiting Professor, University of San Diego School of Law; Clarence Darrow Distin-
guished University Professor, University of Michigan Law School. In writing this Article I
have profited from conversations with Ron Allen, Akhil Amar, Jesse Choper, Don Dripps,
Sam Gross, Daniel Halberstam, Larry Herman, Rick Hills, Jerry Israel, Doug Kahn, Nancy
King, Joan Larsen, Rick Lempert, Ron Mann, Terry Sandalow, Steve Shiffrin, Marc
Spindelman, Bill Stuntz, George Thomas, Peter Westen and Welsh White. Finally, I am
indebted to Eve Brensike, a second-year law student at the University of Michigan Law
School, for her valuable research assistance and helpful comments.
1 HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, A Postscript on Miranda, in BENCHMARKS 266, 269 (1967). Judge
Friendly recognized that in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 490 (1966), Chief Justice
Warren had observed that "Congress and the States are free to develop their own safe-
guards for the privilege, so long as they are fully as effective" as those provided by the now-
familiar Miranda warnings. But this struckJudge Friendly as "mostly for the record. After
the Court has formulated its own detailed requirements and made them so exceedingly
high, it is hard to imagine what interest state legislators would find in seeking to devise
different ones that would only dubiously pass muster." FRiENDLY, supra, at 269 n.11. I
disagree with Judge Friendly on this point. See infra text accompanying notes 137-46.
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INTRODUCTION
I think the great majority of judges, lawyers, and law professors
would have concurred in Judge Friendly's remarks when he made
them thirty-three years ago. To put it another way, I believe few would
have had much confidence in the constitutionality of an anti-Miranda
provision, usually known as § 3501 because of its designation under
Title 18 of the United States Code, a provision of Title II of the Omni-
bus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968 (hereinafter referred
to as the Crime Act or the Crime Bill), when that legislation was
signed by the president on June 19, 1968.2 Section 3501 makes the
pre-Escobedo,3 pre-Miranda4 "due process"-"totality of circum-
2 See Statement by President Lyndon B. Johnson upon Signing the Omnibus Crime
Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 1 PUB. PAPERS 725, 725 (June 19, 1968) [hereinafter
Statement by the President]; Max Frankel, President Signs Broad Crime Bill with Objections,
N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 1968, at Al. The relevant portions of § 3501 read as follows:
§ 3501. Admissibility of confessions
(a) In any criminal prosecution brought by the United States or by the
District of Columbia, a confession, as defined in subsection (e) hereof, shall
be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given. Before such confession is
received in evidence, the trial judge shall, out of the presence of the jury,
determine any issue as to voluntariness. If the trial judge determines that
the confession was voluntarily made it shall be admitted in evidence and
the trialjudge shall permit thejury to hear relevant evidence on the issue of
voluntariness and shall instruct the jury to give such weight to the confes-
sion as the jury feels it deserves under all the circumstances.
(b) The trial judge in determining the issue of voluntariness shall take
into consideration all the circumstances surrounding the giving of the con-
fession, including (1) the time elapsing between arrest and arraignment of
the defendant making the confession, if it was made after arrest and before
arraignment, (2) whether such defendant knew the nature of the offense
with which he was charged or of which he was suspected at the time of
making the confession, (3) whether or not such defendant was advised or
knew that he was not required to make any statement and that any such
statement could be used against him, (4) whether or not such defendant
had been advised prior to questioning of his right to the assistance of coun-
sel; and (5) whether or not such defendant was without the assistance of
counsel when questioned and when giving such confession.
The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be
taken into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue
of voluntariness of the confession.
(e) As used in this section, the term "confession" means any confession
of guilt of any criminal offense or any self-incriminating statement made or
given orally or in writing.
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994).
3 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964), extended the right to counsel to the pre-
indictment stage, but it was unclear whether the right came into play "when the process
shifts from investigatory to accusatory-when its focus is on the accused and its purpose is
to elicit a confession," 378 U.S. at 492, or when the process so shifted and one or more of
the limiting facts in Escobedo were also present. For a summary of the wide disagreement
over the meaning of Miranda-and over what it ought to mean, see YALE KAMSAR, Brewer
v. Williams, Massiah, and Miranda: What Is "Interrogation"? When Does It Matter?, in PoLIcE
INTERROGATION AND CoNFESsIONs: EssAS IN LAW AN POLICY, 161-62 (1980) [hereinafter
POLICE INTERROGATION].
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stances"-"voluntariness" rule the sole test for the admissibility of con-
fessions in federal prosecutions, thereby purporting to overrule by
legislation the Warren Court's two most famous confession cases.
(Although rarely, if ever, noted, § 3501 also literally overrules at least
two other Supreme Court cases.5 )
However, even if it were true that the Supreme Court would not
have permitted Congress to do anything about (or would only have
allowed it to do very little about) Miranda some thirty years ago,
whether the Court will take the same position today is a very different
question. For in the 1970s and 80s the Court had some unkind things
to say about Miranda.6 The Burger and Rehnquist Courts' characteri-
zation of and comments about Miranda give reason to believe that the
In Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976), Escobedo's "focus" test, as it had gener-
ally been understood at the time the case was handed down, was expressly rejected as a
basis for advising a suspect of his constitutional rights. Furthermore, in Kirby v. Illinois, 406
U.S. 682, 688-89 (1972), the principal opinion by Justice Stewart looks back on Escobedo as
the "only seeming deviation" from a long line of cases holding that one's right to counsel
"attaches only at or after the time that adversary judicial proceedings have been initiated
against him." Moreover, added Stewart, "in retrospect" the Court has considered Escobedo a
case effectuating the self-incrimination clause, not the right to counsel. See id. at 689.
Thus, it has been clear for some time that Miranda did not build on the approach taken in
Escobedo as much as it displaced it-Miranda's use of "custodial interrogation" actually
marked a fresh start in describing the point at which constitutional protections begin. But
this was not at all clear to most people at the time Title II of the Crime Bill was drafted and
debated.
4 Miranda held for the first time that the privilege against self-incrimination applies
to the informal proceedings in the interrogation room (or other custodial situations) as
well to more formal proceedings, such as those in a courtroom or before a congressional
committee. To break it down, Miranda held that the privilege may apply to situations
where there is informal pressure to speak, that informal compulsion is inherent in any
custodial questioning and that, in the absence of some equally effective alternative safe-
guard, certain specified warnings are required to dispel the compelling pressures inherent
in custodial interrogation. Thus, as Professor Schulhofer has emphasized, although the
Miranda warnings requirement is the most famous aspect of the case and is often called its
holding, actually it is only the last step in a series of holdings. See Stephen J. Schulhofer,
Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHi. L. REv. 435, 436 (1987).
5 Although, so far as I can tell, no participant in the congressional debate over the
Crime Bill seemed to be aware of this, in addition to purporting to overrule Miranda and
Escobedo, § 3501 literally overruled Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) and Wong
Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). According to the Massiah doctrine, once adver-
sary proceedings have commenced against an individual (i.e., he has been indicted or ar-
raigned), government efforts to "deliberately elicit" incriminating statements from him
violates the individual's right to counsel and bars the use of any resulting statement regard-
less of whether it was voluntarily made. See Massiah, 377 U.S. at 205-07; see also Brewer v.
Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) ("Christian Burial Speech" case); United States v. Henry, 477
U.S. 264 (1980). Wong Sun holds that even voluntary statements may be inadmissible if
derived immediately from an illegal arrest or search or otherwise the "fruit" of a Fourth
Amendment violation. See Wong Sun, 371 U.S. at 484-87. Brown v. linois, 422 U.S. 590
(1975), subsequently held that Miranda warnings, by themselves, do not necessarily purge
the taint of the prior illegal arrest or search. See id. at 604.
6 See Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974); New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649
(1984); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985); infra text accompanying notes 278-311; infra
note 298. On the other hand, the Court had some very nice things to say about Miranda in
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Court's thinking about that famous case has changed dramatically
since the days of the Warren Court.
To give but one example of how the case for upholding the con-
stitutionality of § 3501 has changed: So far as I can tell, no witness
who testified at the committee hearings on the Crime Bill and no par-
ticipant in the House and Senate debates over the bill ever referred to
the Miranda warnings or Miranda procedural safeguards as "prophy-
lactic." This fact is hardly surprising for the Miranda opinion itself
never did so either.7 But when a panel of the Fourth Circuit in United
States v. Dickersons sustained the constitutionality of § 3501, thereby
holding that the pre-Miranda "voluntariness" test set forth in this sec-
tion, rather than the Miranda case, now governs the admissibility of
confessions in the federal courts, it relied heavily on the fact that the
Burger and Rehnquist Courts had "consistently (and repeatedly) ...
referred to the [Miranda] warnings as 'prophylactic' . . . and 'not
themselves rights protected by the Constitution."'9
Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993); see also Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146
(1990). See discussion infra text accompanying notes 361-69, 379-86.
7 So far as I can tell, the first time the Supreme Court explicitly called the Miranda
rules "prophylactic" was in Michigan v. Payne, 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973). Payne declined to give
retroactive effect to "the 'prophylactic' limitations" that North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711 (1969), had established "to guard against the possibility of vindictiveness" in imposing
a more severe sentence upon a defendant who has been retried and reconvicted. Payne,
412 U.S. at 51. The Payne Court observed that
Pearce is analogous to Miranda v. Arizona, in which the Court established
rules... in order to safeguard the rights of the accused and to assure the
reliability of statements made during those interrogations. Thus the pro-
phylactic rules in Pearce and Miranda are similar in that each was designed
to preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal process.
Id.
The closest the Miranda opinion came to using the term prophylactic rule was a refer-
ence to the McNabb and Mallory cases as occasions where "[the Court] recognized both the
dangers of interrogation and the appropriateness of prophylaxis stemming from the very
fact of interrogation itself." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463. Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449
(1957), reaffirmed McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943). The McNabb-Mallory rule
operated to exclude from federal prosecutions all incriminating statements obtained dur-
ing prolonged, and hence illegal, prearraignment detention, regardless of whether the
record showed that the statements were involuntarily made.
A subsection of the same statute that purports to overrule Escobedo and Miranda does
badly cripple the McNabb-Mallory rule. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c). However, since the Mc-
Nabb-Mallory rule-unlike Miranda-was fashioned "quite apart from the Constitution,"
McNabb, 318 U.S. at 341, and in the exercise of the Supreme Court's "supervisory authority
over the administration of [federal] criminal justice," id., it is subject to repeal by Congress.
As I read the Miranda opinion, the Court compared and contrasted the ruling it was hand-
ing down that day with the McNabb-Mallory rule, noting that, because of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure and the effectuation of those rules in McNabb and Mallory, "we have
had little occasion in the past quarter century to reach the constitutional issues in dealing with
federal interrogations." Miranda, 384 U.S. at 463 (emphasis added). "These supervisory
rules," added the Court, "were nonetheless responsive to the same considerations of Fifth
Amendment policy that unavoidably face us now as to the States." Id. (emphasis added).
8 166 F.3d 667 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 275 (1999).
9 Id. at 689.
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In this Article, I shall consider the arguments made in defense of
the constitutionality of § 3501 at the time it was debated and enacted
some thirty years ago and the arguments made on behalf of § 3501
today. But first I think it useful to discuss the history of, and debates
over, § 3501-and the mood of the U.S. Senate (and the country) at
the time.
I
BACKGROUND
A. The Evolution of the Crime Bill
In February 1967, President Lyndon B. Johnson proposed legisla-
tion authorizing massive federal grants to state and local governments
for improving law-enforcement facilities and training new and existing
police personnel.' 0 The Crime Bill that came back to the White
House sixteen months later, which the president reluctantly signed on
June 19, 1968,11 "was a much broader piece of legislation."'12
Although the Crime Bill retained much of the Administration's
original proposals, it also contained two major provisions about which
the president had serious misgivings: Tide III, which granted law en-
forcement officials extensive powers to conduct wiretapping and elec-
tronic surveillance,13 and Title II, which one commentator called "a
grab-bag of anti-Court items.' 4 As finally enacted,' 5 the latter title
had two sections. One, § 3502, purported to "overrule" recent
10 See ADAM CARLYLE BRECKENRIDGE, CONGRESS AGAINST THE COURT 1-3 (1970); RIcH-
ARD HARRIS, THE FEAR OF CRIME 15-20 (1969).
11 PresidentJohnson did not sign the bill until almost the last hour, finally conclud-
ing that it contained "more good than harm." See Frankel, supra note 2. See also HARRIs,
supra note 10, at 109-10 (discussing PresidentJohnson's delay in signing the Crime Bill).
The president opposed Title III of the Crime Bill, which granted law enforcement officials
extensive powers to conduct wiretapping and electronic surveillance. See Statement by the
President, supra note 2, at 726-27. He also was unhappy with various sections of Tite If,
which purported to overturn a number of Supreme Court rulings, including Miranda. See
id. at 727. In signing the bill, the President pointed out that he had asked the Attorney
General and the director of the FBI to assure him that federal agents and attorneys would
continue to give suspects "full and fair warning" of their constitutional rights. Id.; accord
Frankel, supra note 2; BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 3-5.
12 BRECIKENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 3. See also Note, Title H of the Omnibus Crime Control
Act: A Study in Constitutional Conflict, 57 GEo. L.J. 438, 439-40 (1968) (discussing political
history of the Crime Bill).
13 See generally Michael Goldsmith, The Supreme Court and Title 1f. Rewriting the Law of
Electronic Surveillance, 74J. CRim. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1 (1983); Herman Schwartz, The Legiti-
mation of Electronic Eavesdropping. The Politics of "Law and Order," 67 MIcH. L. Ray. 455
(1969).
14 Fred P. Graham, Congress Still Battling the Court, N.Y. TIMES, May 26, 1968, at El5.
15 As reported out of committee, Title II would also have eliminated: (a) any federal
review of the admission of confessions in state cases, (b) any Supreme Court review of
federal court rulings on lineup identifications, and (c) federal habeas corpus jurisdiction
over state prisoners. See Recent Statute, Title If of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets
Act of 1968, 82 HARv. L. REv. 1392, 1392-93 (1969). These jurisdictional restrictions were
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Supreme Court decisions extending the right to counsel to police
lineup identification procedures.' 6 The other section, 3501-the fo-
cus of this article-purported to overturn the Warren Court's two
most famous confession cases, Escobedo17 and Miranda,'8 by providing
that in all federal prosecutions any confessions "shall be admissible in
evidence if it is voluntarily given.'
9
How (and why) did the drastic transformation of the President's
1967 anti-crime bill come about?
By the time the president sent his bill to the Congress (S. 917),
Senator John McClellan, who was to chair the Senate subcommittee
hearings on the bill, had already prepared and introduced several
anti-crime measures of his own. 20 Among them was a bill (S. 674)
governing the admissibility of confessions in federal prosecutions,
which became the aforementioned § 3501 and a bill (S. 675), dealing
with wiretapping and electronic surveillance, which became the afore-
mentioned Title 111.21
Senator McClellan did not object to the Administration's bill, for
he agreed that "[pirograms to better train and equip our police per-
sonnel are needed."22 But he did not believe the Administration's bill
went far enough:
The war on crime must be waged on many fronts . . .Court
decisions that . . . protect and liberate guilty and confirmed
criminals to pursue and repeat their nefarious crimes should be re-
versed and overruled.
[N]o matter how much money we appropriate for local police
departments, we will not have effective law enforcement so long as
the courts allow self-confessed killers to go unpunished. The confu-
sion and disarray injected into law enforcement by such decisions as
. . . Escobedo . . . and Miranda . . . are deplorable and
demoralizing.23
Senator Sam Ervin was sympathetic. Because S. 674 was "directed
at the unjustified handicaps placed upon law enforcement officers
and trial courts" by Escobedo and Miranda, two Supreme Court deci-
deleted on the Senate floor. See id.; Michael A. LaFond, Note, Survey of Title ff. Omnibus
Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 AM. U. L. REv. 157, 158-67 (1968).
16 See infra text accompanying notes 43-56.
17 See supra note 3.
18 See supra note 4.
19 18 U.S.C. § 3501(a) (1994).
20 See Hearings on S. 674, S. 917, S. 675 Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Proce-
dures of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong. 2-3 (1967) (statement of Senator Mc-
Clellan) [hereinafter Senate Hearings].
21 See id. at 74, 75.
22 114 CONG. REC. 11,200 (1968).
23 Id. at 11,200-1. To the same effect is S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 33, 37 (1968).
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sions that "stretched the [Flifth and [S]ixth [A]mendments far be-
yond their true meaning, '24 Ervin "favor[ed] the substance" of
McClellan's bill.25 But Ervin, who some called "the Senate's leading
expert on constitutional law,"26 doubted that the problem caused by
the confession rulings could be corrected by "a simple legislative
enactment": 2
7
It is true that the Miranda opinion invites legislative action on
the subject of police interrogation practices. However, the restric-
tions set forth in that decision and the Escobedo decision are said to
be required by the Constitution, and hence any legislative enact-
ment might be deemed by the Supreme Court to be unconstitu-
tional to the extent that it failed to embody rules of police conduct
at least as restrictive as those in the Miranda and Escobedo
decisions. 28
A short time later, he put it more strongly: "l[T] he way I interpret
the majority opinion in the Miranda case, the majority did give Con-
gress permission to legislate in this field, provided that the require-
ments which Congress might impose were at least as strict as those
imposed by the Court in the Miranda case. '29
For this reason Senator Ervin had introduced a joint resolution
proposing a constitutional amendment (cosponsored by fifteen col-
leagues) providing (a) that "the sole test" for the admissibility of a
confession or incriminating statement in any court "shall be whether
or not it was voluntarily made," and (b) that neither the Supreme
Court nor any other federal court shall have jurisdiction to reverse or
"otherwise disturb" a ruling by any state or federal court admitting a
confession as "voluntarily made" if the ruling "is supported by compe-
tent evidence." 30 However, since introducing the proposed constitu-
tional amendment, Senator Ervin had "come to the conclusion" that
there was "a more direct route" to "rectify the problem" caused by the
Warren Court: Congress had the constitutional power to pass legisla-
tion removing the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts to re-
verse or otherwise disturb rulings by federal trial courts admitting
confessions as voluntarily made.31
24 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 4 (statement of Senator Ervin).
25 Id.
26 HARRIs, supra note 10, at 31. Another commentator put it somewhat differently.
He remarked that Ervin "had read more Supreme Court decisions and agreed with less
than any other member of the Senate." FRED P. GRAHAM, THE SELF-INsCTED WouND 245
(1970).
27 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 4 (statement of Senator Ervin).
28 Id.
29 Id. at 181.
30 113 CONG. REc. 1173-74 (1967); accord Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 4-5.
31 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of Senator Ervin); accord S. REP. No.
90-1097, at 37-38 (1968).
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Thus, announced Ervin, he was introducing a bill to this effect.3 2
The bill would also remove the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and
the lower federal courts to overturn or otherwise disturb a ruling by a
state trial court that a confession was voluntary "if such ruling ha[d]
been upheld by the highest appellate court of that State."33
Senator Ervin stated,
I hated to take the course, but I felt it was the only practical course
available. If we passed a law to overcome [Escobedo and Miranda],
since they are based on constitutional grounds, the courts would say
our law is unconstitutional.
... I introduced [the bill] as the only practical and immediate way
of granting some protection to society in this matter.34
When Title II was reported out of committee, Senator Ervin's
provision, limiting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all fed-
eral courts, caught heavy fire from law professors.3 5 To give but a few
examples:
Harvard Law Professor and former Solicitor General Archibald
Cox emphasized that the power of the Supreme Court to reverse state
convictions under the Fourteenth Amendment has been "necessary to
prevent shocking travesties on justice" and that the Court's effective-
ness in continuing to do so "depends upon its power to determine for
itself whether fundamental rights were denied."36 William Cohen,
then a member of the UCLA law faculty, pointed out that, if enacted,
the Ervin provision "would mark the first time in our history that a
jurisdictional statute has been used to control the merits of the future
decisions of all federal courts."37 Louis Pollack, then Dean of the Yale
Law School, protested that "depriv[ing] federal courts, including the
Supreme Court, of authority to review the voluntariness of confessions
admitted [in] state criminal trials... would destroy one of America's
firmest bulwarks against barbarous forms of law-enforcement." 38
Still stronger criticism came from Francis Allen, then the Dean of
the University of Michigan Law School:
32 See Senate Heaings, supra note 20, at 5 (statement of Senator Ervin).
33 Id.
34 Id. at 193.
35 All the law professors' comments on Tire II appeared in letters to SenatorJoseph
Tydings who had sought the views of law faculty members. Over 200 law professors and law
school deans responded. See infra text accompanying notes 95-96. Apparently, no law pro-
fessor or law school dean was asked to testify at the Senate subcommittee hearings and
none did testify. See infra text accompanying notes 92-93.
36 114 CONG. REc. 13,857 (1968).
37 Id. at 13,852.
38 Id. at 13,865.
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Stripping the Court ofjurisdiction in certain types of cases because
members of Congress happen to disagree with the Court's view of
the constitutional commands is a step down a road that leads to a
fundamental alteration in the distribution of powers in the Ameri-
can system.... I regard Title II as fully as ominous an assault on the
Supreme Court as the court-packing proposals of the 1930's. In
some respects it may be a more insidious threat, for it is less forth-
right and candid, and its dangers less apparent to the public at
large.3 9
It is true that the provision depriving the federal courts of appel-
late jurisdiction to review decisions admitting confessions into evi-
dence, as well as another provision in Title II divesting federal courts
of authority to review state convictions in habeas corpus proceedings,
were deleted by the full Senate.40 But the fact that these provisions
were reported out of committee says a good deal about the intensity of
the hostility McClellan, Ervin and their supporters on the Judiciary
Committee felt toward the Warren Court-and the strength of their
determination to chasten that Court.
The same may be said for the Senate Judiciary Committee's re-
sponse to United States v. Wade,41 a case decided in June of 1967, when
Senator McClellan's subcommittee "was in the final throes of marshal-
ing its testimony and indignation against the Supreme Court's interro-
gation decisions."42 Wade held that a pre-trial lineup was a "critical
stage" of a criminal prosecution and that if defendants were identified
at such a lineup without being afforded the opportunity to be repre-
sented by counsel at this confrontation, any subsequent identifications
in the courtroom were inadmissible unless the prosecution could "es-
tablish by clear and convincing evidence that the in-court identifica-
tions were based upon observations of the suspect other than the
lineup identification." 43
"The problem here," as Professor Francis Allen has observed, "is
not that of releasing an obviously guilty defendant because of the sys-
tem's failure to respect his rights."'44 Rather it "is one of convicting
39 Id. at 13,860.
40 See BRECKENRIInGE, supra note 10, at 89-90; GRAHIAM, supra note 26, at 328-29; HAR-
RIs, supra note 10, at 89-90; OTIS H. STEPHENS, JR., THE SuPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS
OF GUILT 144 & n.72 (1973). Even here, however, "[t]he hard core of the Republican-
southern Democratic bloc held firm. Thirty-two voted to deny appellatejurisdiction. They
lost, however, with fifty-two Senators unwilling to curtail the Court's jurisdiction." BRcK-
ENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 90 (footnote omitted).
41 388 U.S. 218 (1967). The Court also decided two other pretrial identifications the
same day- Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263 (1967), and Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293
(1967).
42 GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 309.
43 Wade, 388 U.S. at 240.
44 Francis A. Allen, The Judicial Quest for Penal Justice: The Warren Court and the Ciminal
Cases, 1975 U. ILL. L. REv. 518, 542.
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the innocent" because "[s]tudies reveal that misidentification may
well be the greatest peril confronting the innocent person caught up
in the criminal process."45 As Justice William Brennan, author of the
majority opinion in Wade, put it: "The vagaries of eyewitness identifica-
tion are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with instances
of mistaken identification. 46
Nevertheless, the Judiciary Committee's response was similar to
its response to Miranda; it pretended that the disliked opinion was
never written and simply reinstated the law that prevailed before the
opinion was handed down.47 Thus § 3502 (as it was finally num-
bered48), another amendment by Senator Ervin, 49 declared simply
that, regardless of whether the defendant was previously identified at
a lineup improperly held in the absence of counsel, "[the] testimony
of a witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the com-
mission of the crime for which the accused is being tried shall be ad-
missible" in any federal prosecution. 50
Nor was that all. Another portion of the Ervin amendment pro-
vided that
neither the Supreme Court nor any [federal] court... shall have
jurisdiction to review, reverse.... or disturb in any way a ruling of
[a state] court ... admitting in evidence ... the testimony of a
witness that he saw the accused commit or participate in the com-
mission of the crime for which the accused is tried.51
This subsection of Title II was deleted by the full Senate,52 but the
legislative repeal of the Wade decision in federal prosecutions passed
by a 3-1 margin.53 "It exists on the books," observed Judge Carl Mc-
Gowan some thirty years ago, "more as the expression of a legislative
hope than as a binding rule of decision, and it will presumably con-
tinue in this posture until the Supreme Court, if it ever does, overrules
or modifies its identification decision."54
45 Id.
46 Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
47 According to GRAM, supra note 26, at 309, Wade might have escaped the atten-
tion of the Congress "if it had not been announced at the height of the backlash against
the Miranda v. Arizona ruling."
48- See 18 U.S.C. § 3502 (1994).
49 See HARRs, supra note 10, at 59. According to Harris, although Senator McClellan
had promised the White House that he would stop Senator Ervin from adding indiscrimi-
nately to the bill, "... . McClellan did nothing when, time after time, Ervin put a hand into
his pocket, saying, 'I got a little amendment here,' and offered it." Id. at 57.
50 See 114 CONG. REc. 14,177 (1968). See also BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 71 (pro-
viding the full text of the bill).
51 114 CONG. REc. 14,177.
52 A motion to strike this subsection passed by a 51-30 vote. See id. at 14,181.
53 A motion to strike this subsection failed, 63-21. See id. at 14,180.
54 Carl McGowan, Constitutional Interpretation and Criminal Identification, 12 WM. &
MARY, L. REv. 225, 249 (1970). According to Judge McGowan, "the... federal courts have
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In Wade, as in Miranda, the Court raised the possibility of alterna-
tive safeguards: "Legislative or other regulations, such as those of local
police departments, which eliminate the risks of abuse and uninten-
tional suggestion at lineup proceedings ... may also remove the basis
for regarding the pretrial lineup stage as 'critical."' 55 But Congress
"contented itself with simply attempting a legislative repeal of the
Court's decision without offering anything to deal with the critical
problem the Court had identified."5 6
The Senate passed its crime bill on May 23, 1968 by a huge mar-
gin.57 The previous August the House had passed the Administra-
tion's crime bill unencumbered by the many titles and provisions that
were to be tacked on to the bill by the Senate. Congressman Emanuel
Celler, who chaired both the House Judiciary Committee and the sub-
committee which held hearings on the crime bill, had managed to
resist all efforts to add anti-Court amendments to the bill.5 8
On June 5, 1968, two weeks after the Senate had passed its crime
bill, the House met to consider it. A distraught Emanuel Celler called
the bill a document "adopted through fear" and "a cruel hoax on citi-
zens for whom crime and the fear of crime are facts of life."5 9 He
warned that "[a] general dissatisfaction with the Supreme Court is no
basis for striking out blindly."60 But Celler's plea that the Senate bill
be sent to conference rather than be accepted without further delay
met a cold reception.
It did not help that June 5, 1968, the day that the House began
consideration of the Senate bill, was also the day that Senator Robert
F. Kennedy had been fatally wounded by an assassin's bullet.6 1 Thus,
as one Congressman observed on the second day of the House debate
on the Senate bill, "we meet on a day, or two days, marked by anxiety,
grief, anger and hostility."62
A number of Congressmen cited the assassination of Senator
Kennedy as a reason for prompt action-a reason for pushing the
considered themselves bound by the Supreme Court's reading of the Constitution rather
than that of the Congress and have appeared to ignore the new statute." IR
55 Wade 388 U.S. at 239.
56 Allen, supra note 44, at 542.
57 After votes on motions to strike various provisions had been taken (and some of
these motions did pass, see BRECKENMIDGE, supra note 10, at 86-93; HAmus, supra note 10, at
82-90), on May 23 the roll was called for a vote on the entire 134-page bill. "By this time,
no one was surprised that the bill passed easily, butjust about everyone was stunned by the
overwhelming margin-seventy-two to four." HARM, supra note 10, at 98.
58 See BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 50-54, 67; HARmis, supra note 10, at 55-57.
59 114 CONG. Ruc. 16,066 (1968).
60 Id.
61 The Senator died the following day. See HARuis, supra note 10, at 107.
62 114 CONG. REc. 16,283 (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier)
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Senate bill through the House without a conference. 63 One member
of the House went so far as to say that he felt the courts' "attitude of
protecting criminals" may have "directly contributed" to the assassina-
tion of Senator Kennedy.64 Congressman John Dow may have voiced
the private thoughts of many of his colleagues, as well as his own views,
when he explained why he was voting for the Senate bill:
This bill, as now amended, I regret exceedingly, and will only
vote for it because of the widespread desire of all our people to curb
crime and prevent continuation of violence in our land. As the
price for this, we are saddled with amendments that threaten our
liberties and may remain to haunt us.
I am voting for this measure out of deference to so many ex-
pressions from constituents in my district who regard protection in
our streets as their paramount anxiety today.65
Whatever the reasons, the mood of the House was such that it
voted 317 to 60 against a conference and then 369 to 17 in favor of
accepting the Senate version in toto.66
B. The Tone of the Senate Debate on Title II
As Professor Otis Stephens noted in his book-length study of the
Supreme Court and confessions: "In the aftermath of Miranda v. Ari-
zona, an array of Supreme Court critics, in and out of Congress, in-
sisted on linking the new interrogation requirements with what they
described as an unparalleled national crisis in crime control and law
enforcement-"67 In newspaper editorials, as well as in legislative halls,
Miranda was charged with wreaking havoc and the Warren Court ac-
cused of "'coddling criminals,' 'handcuffing police,' and otherwise
63 See 114 CONG. REc. 16,072 (statement of Rep. Cahill), 16,280 (statement of Rep.
Skubitz), 16,281 (statements of Reps. Monagan and Blanton), 16,282 (statement of Rep.
Conte), 16,284 (statement of Rep. Helstoski), 16,287 (statement of Rep. Patten), 16,288
(statement of Rep. McClory), 16,294 (statement of Rep. Minish), 16,295 (statement of
Rep. Fisher), 16,297 (statement of Rep. Pollock). However, one member of the House,
Ryan, deemed it "highly inappropriate for the House to use the time of the tragic murder
of Robert Kennedy as the occasion to enact an unwise measure," and he "question[ed]
whether we should be legislating at all on this dark day." See id. at 16,294.
Representative Kastenmeier noted that Kennedy had "neither voted for nor voiced
support for this legislation" and that "[oin the record he opposed many of the provisions
in the [Senate] bill." Id. at 16,283. The day after Senator Kennedy died, Peter Edelman,
who had served as the Senator's legislative assistant, "angrily criticized" the attempt of some
proponents of the Senate crime bill "to cash in on the tragedy, pointing out that the bill
'contains measures that Robert Kennedy very deeply opposed'-in particular, Titles II and
III." HARRIS, supra note 10, at 108.
64 See 114 CONG. REc. 16,076 (statement of Rep. Flynt).
65 114 CONG. REc. 16,287. Dow was a Democrat from upstate New York. See HARIs,
supra note 10, at 108.
66 See BRECKENRIDGE, supra note 10, at 93-94; HARRIS, supra note 10, at 106-08.
67 STEPHENS, supra note 40, at 165.
894 [Vol. 85:883
2000] CAN (DID) CONGRESS "OVERRULE" MIRANDA ? 895
undermining 'law and order' at the very time when police faced their
most perilous and overwhelming challenge."68
Section 3501 and other provisions of Title II were written and
debated against this general background. As Fred Graham, then the
Supreme Court correspondent for the New York Times, observed,
"[w]hen Title II burst from the relative obscurity of the Senate Judici-
ary Committee onto the Senate floor in April of 1968
it was immediately seen as a bald Congressional attempt to rap
the Supreme Court's knuckles over crime. Its provisions read like a
catalogue of familiar grievances against the Warren Court:
First, it purported to reverse Miranda... [in] Federal trials....
Second, it included the similar effort to overrule United States v.
Wade .... These two sections applied only to Federal courts, but it
wvas assumed that state legislatures would pass similar laws if these
were to get by the Supreme Court. Third, it overturned Mallory....
Fourth, it abolished the jurisdiction of the Federal courts to review
state convictions in habeas corpus proceedings. Fifth, it stripped
away the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and all other [federal]
courts to overturn a state court's finding that a confession was vol-
untary or a... trial court's holding that an eye-witness identification
was admissible.
Nothing quite so irregular had ever been aimed at the
Supreme Court by Congress before. It was essentially an attempt to
use a statute to reverse a string of Supreme Court decisions, most of
which had been interpretations of the Constitution.... The sup-
porters of Title II made little effort to disguise their intent to black-
jack the Court into changing its course. In private, Senator
McClellan called it "my petition for a rehearing" on Miranda....
[As the Senate Judiciary Committee] explained, "the Miranda deci-
sion itself was by a bare majority of one, and with increasing fre-
quency the Supreme Court has reversed itself. The Committee feels
that by the time the issue of constitutionality would reach the
Supreme Court, the probability rather is that the legislation would
be upheld."
Those were the sentiments of a committee that was dominated
by Southern senators who had been nursing hurt feelings over the
68 Id.; see also Kenneth C. Stephan, Comment, Title 17 of the Omnibus Crime Bill: A Study
of the Interaction of Law and Politics, 48 NEB. L. REv. 193, 217 (1968). Stephan states:
Title II was inserted into the Omnibus Crime Bill at a time when the Gallup
Poll showed that sixty-three percent of the public felt that courts were too
lenient on criminals, compared to forty-eight percent who held that opin-
ion in 1958. The bill had been enacted in a year when the issue of "law and
order" was a key focal point of political campaigns, with many candidates
mentioning the Supreme Court as a factor related to the increase of crime.
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school desegregation decision of 1954 and who wanted to take it
out on the Supreme Court over crime. 69
Graham characterized Title II as "a piece of dubious statesman-
ship designed more to chastise the Supreme Court than to improve
the law."70 Another close observer of the debate over Title H, Profes-
sor Robert Burt, put it more strongly: "Title II was, to an important
degree, a gesture of defiance at a Court which protected criminals
and Communists, and attacked traditional religious, political, and so-
cial institutions."''v
During the debates on Title II, Senator John McClellan told his
colleagues that "the tone is set at the top" and that "the Supreme
Court has set a low tone in law enforcement."7 2 As already noted,
Senator McClellan chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings on Ti-
de II and drafted some of the Crime Bill provisions. He also managed
the Judiciary Committee's bill. Moreover, McClellan dominated both
the subcommittee hearings and the debates on the Senate floor. One
69 GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 319-20 (quoting S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 51 (1968)). Gra-
ham's reference to the Mallory case is to Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957), dis-
cussed in supra note 7. As pointed out there, because-unlike Miranda-the McNabb-
Mallory rule was fashioned in the exercise of the Court's supervisory powers over federal
criminal justice, it was subject to repeal by Congress.
As for Senator McClellan saying in private that Title II was his "petition for rehearing"
in the Miranda case, he pretty much said the same thing in public. Consider the following
remarks by McClellan:
... It would be my hope that we could avoid the long process of a
constitutional amendment, and that we would find it unnecessary to limit
the court's jurisdiction. It would be my further hope that we could make
such a record here of recorded counsel and opinion of learned jurists and
legal minds that Congress could enact a bill comparable to that which I
have introduced, with such a strong majority that it would invite and induce
the Court to reconsider its opinion in the Miranda case, and thus find the
bill to be constitutional.
Some may say that it is a forlorn hope. But there is an old adage that
wise men change their minds, and I do believe that some of these five men,
one or more of them, are wise....
S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 194.
As for Graham's comment that the Senate Judiciary Committee was dominated by
senators "nursing hurt feelings over the school desegregation decision of 1954," consider,
too, the observations of former Attorney General Nicholas deB. Katzenbach:
I suppose it was almost inevitable that "law and order" got mixed up with
civil rights. It had been, after all, the plea of the white segregationist. To
compound the connection, "law and order" was also the catchword of Barry
Goldwater-who voted against the 1964 [Civil Rights] Act-and George
Wallace-the segregationist hero-in the 1964 and 1968 Presidential cam-
paigns. It was, too, Senators McClellan and Ervin and Thurmond-fervent
segregationists and strong critics of the Court's civil-rights decisions-who
led the legislative battle to curb the Court on criminal procedure.
Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Introduction, in HARMs, supra note 10, at 1, 11.
70 GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 319.
71 Robert A. Burt, Miranda and Title ff. A Morganatic Marriage, 1969 Sup. CT. REv. 81,
127.
72 114 CONG. Rxc. 14,146 (1968).
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might say that as far as the congressional battle over Title II was con-
cerned, Senator McClellan "set the tone at the top," and he set it very
low indeed. The depth of his anger at the Court and the intensity of
his emotion-charged language is evident in many of his statements, as
the following examples demonstrate:
[The] tone is set at the top. The Supreme Court has set a low
tone in law enforcement, and we are reaping the whirlwind today.
Look at [the crime graph] chart. Look at it and weep for your
country. Crime spiraling upward and upward and upward. Appar-
ently nobody is willing to put on the brakes. I say to my colleagues
today that the Senate has the opportunity-and the hour of deci-
sion is fast approaching .... 73
[I]f this confessions provision is defeated, the law-breaker will
be the beneficiary, and he will be further encouraged and reassured
that he can continue a life of crime and depredations profitably
with impunity and without punishment.... [If Title II is defeated]
every gangster and overlord of the underworld; ... every murderer,
rapist, robber... will have cause to rejoice and celebrate.
Whereas, if it is defeated, the safety of decent people will be
placed in greater jeopardy and every innocent, law-abiding ... citi-
zen in this land will have cause to weep and despair.74
Today, why should a policeman go out and risk his life to catch
a known murderer or criminal who is armed with a gun, when the
Supreme Court will find some small technicality... to find a way to
turn that murderer or criminal loose and then, [in its decisions],
attack the officer who risked his life and reflect upon his integrity,
by inferring that we cannot trust a policeman to do right.... That is
their attitude.75
Under the Court's logic in the Miranda case, the day may come
when a parent cannot ask his child about any harm the child has
committed upon his mother without the parent giving him a warn-
ing that anything the child says may be used against him. Should
fathers and mothers be required [to give the Miranda warnings]
before they ask a child about an act that may be criminal ... [?] 76
73 Id. Fred Graham informs us that when Senator McClellan urged the need for and
desirability of Title II, he "propped up in the rear of the Senate chamber a huge facsimile
of the F.B.I.'s crime graph. The tides of key Supreme Court decisions were marked at the
peaks along the rising line, to show the embarrassing parallel between Supreme Court
activity on behalf of defendants and the crime rise." See GRAHAM, supra note 26, at 12. For
criticism of the use (or one should say, misuse) of crime statistics by Senator McClellan and
other politicians, see Yale Kamisar, How to Use, Abuse-and Fight Back with-Crime Statistics,
25 Oya.A. L. REv. 239 (1972).
74 114 CONG. REc. 14,155; see also S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 41, 46.
75 114 CONG. Rc. 13,389.
76 Id. at 13,846.
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[T] he spiraling rate of crime that now plagues our Nation and
endangers our internal security will continue unabated-even
worsen-so long as this rigid and arbitrary prohibition against the
admission into evidence of voluntary confessions by criminals is im-
posed on the processes ofjustice. As chosen representatives of our
people we have a duty to do something about it. 77
***
It was not the Constitution that changed. It was five members
of the Court [in Miranda] who undertook to change the Constitu-
don ....
This is nothing less than an usurpation by the Court of the
power to amend the Constitution. That power is not reposed in the
Court by the Constitution.
It is that usurpation of power and its exercise that we are truly
trying to correct.78
I wholeheartedly agree that [changes in the Constitution
should be made by constitutional amendment]. We are here pro-
testing and trying to rectify 5-4 court decisions which have had the
effect of amending the Constitution-a power the Supreme Court
does not have under the Constitution.79
Throughout the subcommittee hearings and the debates on the
senate floor, Senator Sam Ervin proved to be McClellan's chief lieu-
tenant. He, too, had drafted some of the provisions contained in the
Judiciary Committee's Crime Bill.8 0 As we have seen, at first Ervin had
balked at attempting to overturn Miranda by legislation. But then Er-
vin threw himself into the battle with considerable gusto:
If you believe that the people of the United States should be
ruled by a judicial oligarchy composed of five Supreme Court Jus-
tices rather than by the Constitution of the United States, you ought
to vote against Title II. If you believe that self-confessed murderers,
rapists, robbers, arsonists, burglars, and thieves ought to go unpun-
ished, you ought to vote against Title II.... But if you believe, as
the Senator from North Carolina believes, that enough has been
done for those who murder and rape and rob, and that something
ought to be done for those who do not wish to be murdered or
raped or robbed, then you should vote for Title 11.81
[W] hen the Supreme Court takes the words of the Constitution
and attributes to them a meaning which allows self-confessed mur-
77 Id. at 13,847.
78 Id. at 13,846.
79 Id. at 13,849.
80 See HARRIs, supra note 10, at 31.
81 114 CONG. IRc. 14,155.
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derers and rapists and arsonists... to go free ofjustice, then I think
it is time for us to do something because we are the only power on
earth which can do anything to protect American people against
decisions like this, decisions which constitute a usurpation of power
denied to the majority of the Supreme Court by the very instrument
they profess to interpret.8 2
All I can say is that the majority of the Supreme Court, in the
Miranda case .... evidently wedded themselves to the strange theory
that no man should be allowed to confess his guilt, even though the
Bible says, even though psychiatrists assert, and even though those
interested in the rehabilitation of prisoners declare that an honest
"confession is good for the soul." Hence, they invented rules in the
Miranda case to keep people from confessing their crimes and sins.
The wisest of men could not have devised more efficacious rules to
accomplish this object had he pondered the question a thousand
years.8 3
As the Senate debate on the Crime Bill intensified, Republican
presidential candidate Richard M. Nixon issued his position paper on
crime, Toward Freedom from Fear.84 This paper demonstrated that when
it came to using the Court as a scapegoat for the crime and violence
that beset the nation, Mr. Nixon yielded neither to Senator McClellan
nor Senator Ervin nor any other Democratic politician. Nixon urged
Congress to pass the bill overturning Escobedo and Miranda and restor-
ing the voluntariness test as a way to "redress the imbalance" caused
by these decisions-a way to offset the blow suffered by "the peace
forces in our society."8 5
In the last seven years while the population of this country was
rising some ten percent, crime in the United States rose a stagger-
ing 88 percent.
[A] contributing cause of this staggering increase is that street
crime is a more lucrative and less risky occupation than it has ever
been in the past. Only one of eight major crimes committed now
82 Id. at 12,475.
83 Id. at 14,030. Senator Ervin also stated at the subcommittee hearings that "neither
the Congress, nor the Supreme Court nor anybody else could ever be smart enough to
devise any rules more calculated to prevent anybody from ever confessing their guilt than
those that are laid down in the Miranda decision." Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 196
(statement of Senator Ervin). Consider, too, his statement at the hearings that Miranda
"not only handicaps law enforcement, not only weighs the scales ofjustice in favor of the
criminal and against society and the victims of crime, but, by discouraging the making of
confessions, it even denies the man the benefit of the therapeutic value of an honest con-
fession." Id. at 256.
84 The text of presidential candidate Nixon's position paper on crime, dated May 8,
1968, is set forth at 114 CONG. REc. 12,936-39.
85 Id. at 12,937.
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results in arrest, prosecution, conviction and punishment-and a
twelve percent chance of punishment is not adequate to deter a
man bent on a career in crime. Among the contributing factors to
the small figure are the decisions of a majority of one of the United
States Supreme Court.
The Miranda and Escobedo decisions of the high court have had
the effect of seriously ham stringing [sic] the peace forces in our
society and strengthening the criminal forces.
From the point of view of the peace forces, the cumulative ef-
fect [of] these decisions has been to very nearly rule out the "confes-
sion" as an effective and major tool in prosecution and law
enforcement.
From the point of view of the criminal forces, the cumulative
impact of these decisions has been to set free patently guilty individ-
uals on the basis of legal technicalities.
The tragic lesson of guilty men walking free from hundreds of
courtrooms across the country has not been lost on the criminal
community.
The balance must be shifted back toward the peace forces in
our society and a requisite step is to redress the imbalance created
by these specific decisions. I would thus urge Congress to enact
proposed legislation that-dealing with both Miranda and Fsco-
bedo---would leave it to thejudge and the jury to determine both the
voluntariness and the validity of any confession.
[I] think [the Warren Court's criminal procedure decisions]
point up a genuine need-a need for future Presidents to include
in their appointments to the United States Supreme Court men
who are thoroughly experienced and versed in the criminal laws of
the land.8
6
Senator Karl Mundt, who asked and obtained unanimous consent
to print Nixon's position paper in the Congressional Record, noted that
"[m]uch of what the former Vice President discusses in his position
paper is before us in the form of' the Crime Bill.8 7 So Senator Mc-
Clellan would have had his colleagues believe. One close observer of
86 Id. at 12,936-8. For criticism of Mr. Nixon's 1968 position paper on crime, see
Kamisar, supra note 73, at 241-42, 250-52. The "only one-in-eight crimes results in convic-
tion" statistic is especially jolting-but highly misleading. Even if the conviction rate (the
percentage of those held for prosecution who are found guilty) were 100 percent, only one
reported crime in six would result in a conviction, because only one reported crime in six
leads to a criminal prosecution. The great bulk of reported crimes never lead to an arrest.
See id. at 251-52.
87 114 CONG. Rac. 12,936.
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the Senate debate opined that "McClellan's most eminent supporter
turned out to be Richard Nixon. ' 8
C. The Senate Subcommittee Hearings on Title II and the
Senate Judiciary Committee Report
During the debate on the Senate floor, Senators Ervin and Mc-
Clellan repeatedly referred to the transcript of the McClellan subcom-
mittee hearings for overwhelming evidence of the heavy blow the
Warren Court's confession rulings had dealt law enforcement and the
strong need to right the situation by overturning the rulings.8 9 Unfor-
tunately, when it came to open-mindedness and fair play, Senator Mc-
Clellan's subcommittee hearings left a great deal to be desired. As
one close student of Title II pointed out, "the familiar claims of a di-
rect connection between the enlargement of procedural requirements
and a rising crime rate were repeated by a parade of district attorneys,
police chiefs, and other representatives of what might be called the
'law enforcement lobby."' 90 Senator McClellan himself noted (with ev-
ident pride) that the record of his subcommittee hearings "contains
letters from 122 chiefs of police in 37 States."91
When SenatorJoseph Tydings, who led the opposition to Title II
in the Senate, charged that not a single constitutional law professor or
criminal law professor had been given an opportunity to testify before
Senator McClellan's subcommittee on the wisdom or constitutionality
of this proposal, 92 McClellan did not deny it. He responded simply
that every member of the Senate had been invited to testify and that a
88 HARRis, supra note 10, at 73.
89 See, e.g., 114 CONG. RFc. 12,470, 14,019, 14,036, 14,141; see also S. REP. No. 90-1097,
at 46-48 (1968).
90 STEPHENS, supra note 40, at 141.
91 114 CONG. REc. 14,036.
92 See id. at 11,894, 11,901. However, one law professor, Fred E. Inbau, had been
invited to, and did, express his views in writing. Professor Inbau, it should be noted, was
co-author of a police interrogation manual that had been quoted at great length, and
never with approval, in Miranda. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 449-55 (1966).
Moreover, Professor Inbau was greatly admired by many law enforcement officials for his
articulation of police needs and concerns, and for his sharp criticism of various confession
cases decided by the Supreme Court. See generally YALE KAMusAR, Fred E. Inbau: "The Impor-
tance of Being Guilty," in PoLIcE INTERROGATION, supra note 3, at 95.
Finally, it should be pointed out that even Professor Inbau had "much doubt" about
the constitutionality of a bill to abolish Miranda:
I am in thorough sympathy with the objectives of this bill and hope Con-
gress will enact it although much doubt remains as to its constitutionality in
view of... Miranda .... If enacted into law [it] would at least afford an
opportunity for the Supreme Court reconsideration of its 5 to 4 decision in
the Miranda case. It is not inconceivable that a change in the composition
of the Court in the next few years may result in a reexamination of the
Miranda doctrine and perhaps in an overruling of that decision ....
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 676 (statement of Professor Inbau).
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person from Tydings' own state had also testified (the president of the
Maryland district attorneys association).93
The conspicuous absence of any law professors at the subcommit-
tee hearings (or any defense lawyers or public defenders for that mat-
ter)94 could hardly be attributed to a lack of interest by those in
academia. When asked by Senator Tydings to state their views on the
desirability of § 3501 and other anti-Court provisions and on the
power of Congress to enact them, 212 law professors (including
twenty-four law school deans) from forty-three law schools had re-
sponded.95 Most attacked the constitutionality of the anti-Miranda
provision; not a single one defended it.96
Almost all of the law enforcement officials who appeared before
the Senate subcommittee talked about both the need for and the con-
stitutionality of Title II, thus telling McClellan, Ervin and their allies
what they wanted, and expected, to hear. But the testimony of the
most eminent witness to appear before the subcommittee, J. Edward
Lumbard, Chief Judge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit and Chairman of the ABA Special Committee on Minimum
93 See 114 CONG. REC. 11,901.
94 However, Lawrence Speiser, director of the Washington, D.C. office of the ACLU,
did appear as a witness and did oppose the "attempt to overturn Miranda by legislation."
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 1173.
95 See 114 CONG. REc. 18,850.
96 The full text of the law professors' and law school deans' letters to Senator Tydings
appears in 114 CONG. REc. 13,851-67. A substantial number of professors concentrated
their heaviest fire on another provision of the bill-one that would have denied the
Supreme Court and any federal court the power to review state court determinations that a
confession was voluntarily made. This provision was deleted by the full Senate.
Although many of the professors who responded to Senator Tydings's request at-
tacked the wisdom and constitutionality of the provisions purporting to overrule Escobedo,
Miranda, and Wade quite forcefully, perhaps the most devastating criticism of all came from
one who wrote to the New York Times rather than to Senator Tydings. At a time when many
believed that the anti-Court provisions of the Crime Bill called for its veto, Professor Her-
bert Wechsler, deservedly called "one of the most distinguished students of constitutional
law in the country," CHARLEs ALAN WRiGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL
§ 76 at 187 n.30 (Sd ed. 1999), and one whose criticism of Title II "was especially weighty
because he is unsympathetic with the Miranda decision," id., reached the conclusion that
"offensive as these sections are," they do not justify a veto of the bill because they are so
likely to be held "constitutionally ineffective" that
[n]o responsible trial judge would jeopardize a criminal conviction by
following the statute in his rulings on admissibility, nor would a sensible
prosecutor even seek a ruling in these terms since it would certainly invite
reversal.
It can, therefore, be predicted with confidence that the offensive sec-
tions of the bill would be dead letters even in the district courts.
Herbert Wechsler, Letter to the Editor: Legislating Crime Contro N.Y. TuMEs, June 16, 1968, at
B19.
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Standards for Criminal Justice,97 probably surprised and disappointed
proponents of Title II.
A year earlier, Judge Lumbard had voiced his unhappiness with
the approach the Supreme Court had taken in Escobedo.98 And during
his appearance before the subcommittee he made it clear he was not
enamored of Miranda.99 At one point he agreed that the self-incrimi-
nation clause would seem to have no bearing whatever on the admissi-
bility of a confession that satisfied the traditional pre-Miranda
voluntariness test (calling this his "own personal view").100 At another
point, he agreed that there is "no better evidence" of a person's guilt
than his own voluntary confession. 1 1 Nevertheless, Judge Lumbard
balked at overturning Miranda by legislation.
He told the subcommittee that if Congress were unhappy with
Miranda because it unduly hampered police efforts to apprehend
criminals "the only way to correct the situation would be by amend-
ment of the Constitution... we must apply the Constitution and the
law as the Supreme Court has interpreted them."10 2 When asked spe-
cifically whether the much-quoted language in Miranda "en-
courag[ing] Congress and the States to consider their laudable search
for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our laws" 10 3 "opens the
door for legislation [such as Title II] which would permit our avoiding
the constitutional amendment process," 0 4 Judge Lumbard answered,
"No; I don't think it permits you to do that."10 5 He added that Con-
gress could not enact legislation that failed to do everything the Court
said had to be done "[u]nless you can find some suitable substitute for
the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court."10 6
At this point, Senator McClellan made it plain that he was only
interested in abolishing Miranda, not in finding a "suitable substitute"
for it. He also left little doubt that he was well aware that abolishing
Miranda by legislation would be a risky venture. Consider the follow-
ing exchange:
97 Judge Lumbard also had three terms of service in the office of U.S. Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, the third term (from 1953-55) as head of the office. See
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 170 (statement of Judge Lumbard).
98 SeeJ. Edward Lumbard, New Standards for Criminal Justice, 52 A.BA. J. 431, 432
(1966).
99 He subsequently made it still clearer in a law review article. SeeJ. Edward Lumbard,
Some Consequences of the CriminalJustice Revolution, 56 GEo. L.J. 645, 655-58 (1968).
100 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 189, 190 (statement of Judge Lumbard).
101 Id. at 191.
102 Id. at 184.
103 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
104 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 195 (statement of Judge Lumbard).
105 Id,
106 Id. at 196.
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SENATOR McCuELLAN.... If they [a majority of the Justices]
base the Miranda decision strictly on constitutional issues, I don't
understand how you could write a statute that did not do everything
the Court has said must be done. And if you do that, you destroy
everything that you seek to attain anyhow.
JUDGE LuivmARD. Unless you can find some suitable substitute
for the requirements laid down by the Supreme Court ....
SENATOR McCLELLAN. They [a majority of the Justices]
wouldn't accept it as suitable unless it accomplished the destruction
that their decision does. They say it is based on the Constitution. I
don't know how you can do it. They say you have got to do these
things. Well, how can you do less if the Constitution requires that
this be done?10 7
In the Senate Committee on the Judiciary's report recom-
mending that Title II be enacted into law, the committee maintained
that "[tihe Supreme Court itself suggests" that Congress is free to
overturn Miranda by statute and that Congress should accept this invi-
tation because it "is better able to cope with the problem of confes-
sions than is the Court."'0 8 With one exception, the Committee relied
only on law enforcement officials and several U.S. Senators who had
testified before the subcommittee. 0 9 The one exception was Judge
Lumbard, even though, as we have seen, he appeared to have said just
the opposite of what the committee wished to hear. How did this re-
markable turn of events come about?
The Judiciary Committee Report took Judge Lumbard's testi-
mony out of context. The Report quotes the judge as follows:
In my opinion, it is most important that the Congress should
take some action in the important areas I have discussed. The legis-
lative process permits a wide variety of views to be screened and
testimony can be taken from those who know the facts and those
who bear the responsibility for law enforcement.
The legislative process is far better calculated to set standards
and rules by statute than is the process of announcing principles
through court decisions in particular cases where the facts are lim-
ited. The legislative process is better adapted to seeing the situation
in all its aspects and establishing a system and rules which can gov-
em a multitude of different cases." 0
This testimony sounds as if Judge Lumbard was cheering on the
Congress in its efforts to abolish Miranda by legislation, but only be-
cause the Judiciary Committee omitted both what the judge had told
the subcommittee earlier and what he was to tell it later. Judge Lum-
107 Id. at 196-97.
108 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 46 (1968).
109 See id. at 46-48.
11o Id. at 46 (emphasis added).
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bard had pointed out earlier that the Miranda Court had not dealt
with certain situations, such as what rules, if any, should apply when
the police are questioning someone not in custody, e.g., interviewing a
person in his own home with other family members present, telling
Congress it should "feel free to state a policy and lay down appropri-
ate rules regarding the admission of evidence" in these situations."'
These were "the important areas" Judge Lumbard was talking about in
the portion of his testimony quoted by the Judiciary Committee (areas
for which the Miranda opinion had not provided definite answers)
when he testified he thought it "most important that the Congress
should take some action in the important areas I have discussed."" 2
If there were any doubts about whatJudge Lumbard meant in the
testimony quoted by the Committee Report, he resolved them later
when responding to a question by Senator Hugh Scott:
No; I don't think [the language encouraging the Congress to
establish other procedures which are equally effective in apprising
suspects of their rights] permits you to do that [overturn Miranda
without invoking the constitutional amendment process], but there
certainly is a wide area which obviously the Court has not covered in
its opinion in the Miranda cases, not only the matter of questioning
before a person is in custody, but then the manner in which the
defendant or suspect is handled while he is in custody, the way in
which the warning is given, the record that is made, the presence of
other people ... these are obviously the next questions that are
going to be raised in contested cases.
I think that this whole area is open to the Congress and.., it
would be most helpful and most important that Congress should
attempt to deal with these areas, and lay down the rules and the
standards so far as Federal cases are concerned. 113
The Judiciary Committee Report was also less than honest in its
treatment of the testimony of another federal judge who appeared at
the subcommittee hearings: Judge Alexander Holtzoff, a federal dis-
trictjudge for the District of Columbia. The Committee assured the
full Senate thatJudge Holtzoff "sees no constitutional bar to congres-
sional abrogation of the Mallory rule," quoting from his testimony." 4
But when it discussed Congress's freedom to enact legislation over-
turning Escobedo and Miranda,"5 the Committee omitted any refer-
ence to Judge Holtzoff's testimony, no doubt because this time he told
111 See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 181-82 (statement ofJudge Lumbard).
112 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 46.
113 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 195-96 (statement of Judge Lumbard). A year
later Judge Lumbard reiterated this point in a law review article. See Lumbard, supra note
99, at 658-59.
114 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 40.
115 See id. at 46-51.
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the subcommittee that there was a constitutional bar to congressional
action:
Of course, the Escobedo and the Miranda cases are in a different class
[than Mallory] in one important respect. They are based on the
Constitution. They hold that the Constitution requires these warn-
ings. Therefore, it would take a constitutional amendment, unless
the Supreme Court overrules itself, whereas, the Mallory rule being
purely a procedural rule, can be changed by legislation. 116
Those asked to testify at the Senate subcommittee hearings on
the Crime Bill were those whose testimony was expected to advance
the cause of the subcommittee's chairman, Senator John McClellan.
As the SenateJudiciary Committee Report's treatment of testimony of
Judges Holtzoff and Lumbard well illustrates, on those rare occasions
when a witness said something that disappointed Senator McClellan,
that testimony was misrepresented or simply ignored.
The legislative history of § 3501 makes it hard to take seriously an
argument that proponents of the provision are bound to make in the
Supreme Court-the Court should defer to Congress's superior fact-
finding capacity. On this occasion at least, the much-vaunted superior
fact-finding capacity of Congress was little in evidence. The legislative
history of § 3501 also greatly impairs, if it does not destroy, other argu-
ments that proponents of the provision are likely to make in the
Supreme Court-that § 3501 takes into account the Miranda warnings
or recognizes the central holding of Miranda"7 or represents a
"blend" of the old voluntariness test and the new Miranda decision.
The last thing congressional proponents of § 3501 wanted to do was
to pay respect to Miranda. They were determined to bury Miranda,
not to recognize it.
D. Would the Justices Who Dissented in Miranda Have Upheld
§ 3501?
A final word about the subcommittee hearings. Throughout the
hearings Senator McClellan made clear his assumption that the four
justices who had dissented in Miranda would vote to uphold legisla-
tion overturning that former case, and thus he needed only one more
vote to prevail:
[I] t may be a forlorn hope, but I should like to hope that if this
legislation is enacted and its constitutionality is tested, only one Jus-
tice changing his position would sustain the law. That wouldn't be
unheard of with respect to members of the Court."18
116 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 264 (statement ofJudge Holtzoff).
117 In fact, the Fourth Circuit did maintain in Dickerson that § 3501 "did not completely
abandon the central holding of Miranda." See infra text accompanying note 242.
118 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 180 (statement of Senator McClellan).
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I understand they [the 5-4 majority] premised their decision in the
Miranda case upon a constitutional ground ....
But there are only five of the nine judges that so held. I won-
der if it is a forlorn hope .. . that one of them at least might be
persuaded that they have gone a little too far.119
[I]f [the bill] became law and was taken to the Supreme Court, and
the five still felt that under its previous decisions it is unconstitu-
tional, it would still only take one wise man of the five to change his
mind.120
The Senate Judiciary Committee Report was even more emphatic
on this point. The opinions of the four Miranda dissenters, the Com-
mittee assured the full Senate, "clearly indicate that neither of them
would consider these provisions unconstitutional. Justice Harlan, it
will be recalled, said the majority opinion 'represents poor constitu-
tional law". 12 1
But nothing in the Miranda dissents indicates that those who wrote
or joined these opinions would uphold legislation purporting to over-
rule Miranda. Justice Harlan did say the Miranda decision "represents
poor constitutional law."1 2 2 But there is a big leap between calling a
Supreme Court decision unsound or poor constitutional law and con-
cluding that therefore the decision can be overruled by mere
legislation.
Justice White wrote an even more forceful dissenting opinion in
Miranda than did Justice Harlan, but Justice White was not too angry
to make the following observations:
That the Court's holding today is neither compelled nor even
strongly suggested by the language of the Fifth Amendment, is at
odds with American and English legal history, and involves a depar-
ture from a long line of precedent does not prove either that the
Court has exceeded its powers or that the Court is wrong or unwise
in its present reinterpretation of the Fifth Amendment.... [W] hat
[the Court] has done is to make new law and new public policy in
119 Id. at 264.
120 Id.; see also supra note 69.
121 S. RsEs. No. 90-1097, at 51 (1968). Justice Harlan did so describe Miranda at the
outset of his dissenting opinion, see Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 504 (1966), but the
Committee seemed to assume that Harlan called the Miranda case "poor constitutionallaw,"
i.e., constitutionally suspect, rather than "poor constitutional law," i.e., mediocre constitu-
tional interpretation. Nine months after the Crime Bill was signed by the president,Justice
Harlan concurred in the result in Orozco v. Texas, 394 U.S. 324 (1969), a case that gave
Miranda an expansive reading. "The passage of time ha[d] not made the Miranda case any
more palatable" to him, id. at 323, but "purely out of respect for stare decisis,"Justice Harlan
"reluctantly" felt "compelled to acquiesce" in the Court's application of Miranda. Id at
328.
122 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 504 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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much the same way that it has in the course of interpreting other
great clauses of the Constitution. This is what the Court historically
has done. Indeed, it is what it must do and will continue to do until
and unless there is some fundamental change in the constitutional
distribution of governmental powers. 123
On the basis of these comments alone, I think it fair to say that if
the constitutionality of § 3501 had come before him when he was still
a member of the Court, Justice White would have had little difficulty
striking down the section. Nor is this the only evidence of Justice
White's views.
A year after Miranda was handed down, Justice White spoke at the
annual meeting of the Conference of ChiefJustices. The Chairman of
the Conference, Chief Justice Carleton Harris of the Supreme Court
of Arkansas, had asked Justice White to talk about Miranda and he
agreed to do so.12 4 I venture to say that what Justice White told the
chief justices of the states was not what most of them wanted to
hear:125
Is the arrested suspect, alone with the police in the station
house, being "compelled" to incriminate himself when he is interro-
gated without proper warnings? Reasonable men may differ about
the answer to that question, but the question itself is a perfectly
straightforward one under the Fifth Amendment and little different
in kind from many others which arise under the Constitution and
which must be decided by the courts. No ready answer to Miranda
can be found by reference to the text of the Constitution alone.
The answer lies in the purpose and history of the self-incrimination
clause and in our accumulated experience.
This kind ofjudicial decision making is inherent in our present
governmental structure. All of you know it is, for you too are faced
with the identical provisions and must decide the same
questions....
123 Id. at 531 (White, J., dissenting).
124 Justice White noted this at the outset of his talk. SeeJustice Byron R. White, Recent
Developments in Criminal Law, Address Before the Nineteenth Annual Meeting of the
Conference of Justices (Aug. 3, 1967), in COUNcIL OF STATE GoVERNMENTs, PROCEEDINGS
OF THE NINETEENTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE CONFERENCE OF CHIEF JUSTICES (1967). I
heard Justice White give the talk, but was unaware that it had been published in the pro-
ceedings of the conference until Barbara Garavaglia, Head of Reference, University of
Michigan Law Library, found it for me.
125 At the annual meeting of the state chief justices held a year earlier (two short
months after Miranda was decided), I participated in four lively workshop sessions with a
goodly number of the chiefjustices. As I reported shortly thereafter, on the basis of my
conversations with various state chiefjustices I came away with the distinct impression that
they were "overwhelmingly opposed" to the Miranda decision. SeeYALE KAusAR, A Dissent
from the Miranda Dissents: Some Comments on the "New"Fifth Amendment and the Old "Voluntari-
ness" Tes in POLICE INTERROGATION, supra note 3, at 237 n.1.
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Of course, to say that the courts must decide a case like Mi-
randa[ ] is one thing. The question of whether it is correctly or
wisely decided is quite another. As a matter of constitutional inter-
pretation, I disagreed with the result reached in that case and the
reasons given for it and repeated my disagreement last term. But it
is now the law and whatever its merits, it is plainly a derivative of
Malloy v. Hogan, applying the Fifth Amendment to the States, and
Gideon v. Wainwright which required counsel in most kinds of crimi-
nal cases. In terms of the function which the Court was performing,
I see little difference between Miranda and the several other deci-
sions, some old, some new, which have construed the Fifth Amend-
ment in a manner in which it has never been construed before, or
as in the case of Miranda, contrary to previous decisions of the
Court and of other courts as well. Cases such as Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, and Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547, immediately
come to mind. I likewise consider extremely important the two
cases of last term, Garrity v. New Jersey and Spevack v. Klein. In the
first, Ganity, the Court held inadmissible, as compelled within the
meaning of the Fifth Amendment, the statements of a city employee
made in response to inquiries about his job performance and under
threat of loss of employment. In Spivack, the Fifth Amendment was
said to shield a lawyer from producing information at a disbarment
hearing and to prevent his disbarment for such refusal. 126
II
WHAT CAN BE SAID FOR THm CONSTrlTUTONALriY
OF § 3501?
A. Arguments Made at the Time the Crime Bill Was Enacted
Although members of the Senate Judiciary Committee who read
the Miranda opinion carefully or attended the Senate subcommittee
hearings regularly had to know this was highly misleading, the Senate
Report states that "[t]he Supreme Court itself suggests that Congress
is free to enact legislation in this field," perhaps because of the "wide-
spread notion that Congress is better able to cope with the problem of
confessions than is the Court."127 At another point, the Report states
that "the committee feels that Congress ... should respond to the
majority opinion's invitation to Congress"128 to continue its "'laudable
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the
126 White, supra note 124, at 42-43. The full citations to the cases cited by Justice White
are, in order of cases cited: Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142
U.S. 547 (1892); Garrity v. NewJersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967); Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511
(1967).
127 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 46 (1968).
128 l& at 5O.
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individual while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws.'"129
These remarks are jarring when one considers that this segment
of the report never quotes Miranda's caveat that "[u]nless adequate
protective devices are employed to dispel the compulsion inherent in
custodial surroundings, no statement obtained from the defendant
can truly be the product of his free choice" 30 nor the caveat that "un-
less we are shown other procedures which are at least as effective in
apprising accused persons of their right of silence and in assuring a
continuous opportunity to exercise it, the [Miranda] safeguards must
be observed."131
One is even more taken aback by the statements in the Senate
Report about the Court's "invitation to Congress" to legislate in this
field when one recalls these statements were made despite.
(a) Senator Ervin's realization that any legislation in this field
would probably be unconstitutional to the extent that it failed to pro-
vide safeguards at least as effective as those imposed by the Miranda
CourtL3 2
(b) Senator McClellan's awareness that § 3501 would be invali-
dated by the Supreme Court if the 5-4 Miranda majority adhered to its
position.' 3
(c) Chief Judge Lumbard's unequivocal testimony that Congress
could not enact legislation in the area covered by Miranda unless it
found "some suitable substitute" for the safeguards prescribed by the
Court. 3 4
(d) Judge Holtzoffs unequivocal testimony that "it would take a
constitutional amendment" to overturn Miranda, "unless the Supreme
Court overrules itself'. 3 5
(e) Attorney General Ramsey Clark's statement to Senator Mc-
Clellan that if the Crime Bill is "intended to dispense with the proce-
dural safeguards established by Miranda or if it is designed to modify
the constitutional standard of voluntariness, it would be in conflict
with current constitutional requirements.' u86
129 Id. (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
130 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
131 Id. at 467.
132 See supra text accompanying notes 28-29, 34.
133 See supra note 69 and text accompanying notes 118-20.
134 See supra text accompanying note 107; see also supra notes 111-13 and accompanying
text.
135 See supra text accompanying note 116.
136 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 357 (statement of Attorney General Clark). The
Senate Report makes no mention of Attorney General Clark's statement. Nor does the
Report make any reference to Judge Holtzoff's and Judge Lumbard's views that Miranda
can not be overturned by legislation. However, the Report quotes from the testimony of
both judges on other points.
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It is unclear what would constitute a suitable substitute for Mi-
randa safeguards. One possibility, suggested by Judge Lumbard him-
self at the Senate subcommittee hearings,13 7 would be eliminating or
greatly restricting police interrogation in favor of a system of judicial
or judicially supervised questioning. Under the proposal, a suspect
would be questioned either by or before ajudicial officer, would have
the assistance of counsel and would be informed that she need not
answer any questions. But she would also be told that if subsequently
prosecuted her refusal to answer questions at the earlier proceeding
would be disclosed at trial. 138
Even before Escobedo and Miranda, as Justice Frankfurter once
noted, this proposal was the one "most frequently made with the ob-
ject of curbing third-degree methods by the police."13 9
In the wake of Miranda, a number of commentators returned to
this proposal and built upon it.140 As I said of the proposal a quarter-
century ago, a modernized version of it (i.e., a package providing for
judicial warnings, judicial supervision of any ensuing interrogation,
and video taping or audio taping of the entire proceeding) "would
present an attractive alternative to the Miranda model."141
Another possible alternative to the Miranda warnings would be a
system of video taping (or at least audio taping) the entire interroga-
tion session in place of the warnings or in exchange for a shortened
version of the warnings.
Arguing that "recording maintains, and in many ways exceeds,
Miranda's supposed benefits of deterring coercion and preventing
false confessions" and "has the advantage over Miranda of not signifi-
137 See Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 197 (statement of Judge Lumbard).
138 Paul Kauper, Judicial Examination of the Accused-A Remedy for the Third Degree, 30
MicH. L. REV. 1224 (1932), seems to have been the first commentator to spell out the
desirability of, and historical support for, such a procedure, as well as the first to marshal,
and to evaluate with any degree of thoroughness, the policy and constitutional arguments
against such a procedure. See YALE KAnsAR, Kauper's :Judicial Examination of the Accused"
Forty Years Later-Some Comments on a Remarkable Article, in PoUcE INTERROGATION, supra
note 3, at 77. Would the comment on the suspect's refusal to answer questions at the
pretrial proceeding pass muster? Compare Donald A. Dripps, Foreword. Against Police Interro-
gation-and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 78 J. GRIM. L. & CRIMNOLOGY 699, 730
(1988), and Phillip E.Johnson, A Statutory Replacement for the Miranda Doctrine, 24 Am. CRm.
L. REv. 303, 309 (1986), with Albert W. Alschuler, A Peculiar Privilege in HistoricalPerspective:
The Right to Remain Silent 94 MicH. L. REv. 2625, 2670-72 (1996), and Marvin Frankel, From
Private Rights to PublicJustice, 51 N.Y.U. L. REv. 516, 531 (1976).
139 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 571 n.2 (1961) (plurality opinion).
140 See, e.g., WALTER ScHAEFER, THE SusPECr AND Socurnr 76-81 (1967); Henry Friendly,
The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change; 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 713-
16 (1968);Johnson, supra note 138. Cf Akhil Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amend-
ment Frst Pinciples: The Self-Incrimination Clause; 93 MicH. L. Rxv. 857, 858-59, 898-901, 908-
09 (1995).
141 KAmisAR, supra note 138, at 83.
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cantly impeding law enforcement," 142 Professor Paul Cassell has pro-
posed a system of video taping police questioning and a modified set
of warnings for the now-familiar Miranda warnings. 143 But this propo-
sal has been sharply criticized by Professor Stephen Schulhofer, who
maintains that it "strip[s] arrested suspects of their right to consult
counsel during pre-arraignment interrogation .... eliminate [s] the
requirement that interrogation be preceded by an explicit waiver of
rights, and ... eliminate[s] Miranda's requirement that interrogation
cease if a suspect makes a clear request to break off questioning or to
consult with counsel."' 44
I think there is a good deal to what Schulhofer says. Neverthe-
less, I would award quite a few points to a system that requires law
enforcement officers to tape whenever feasible how they address the
suspect, how he responds and what occurs thereafter, how the police
deliver whatever warnings they must give, how the suspect waives
whatever rights he has, and all subsequent questioning and statements
made in response. 145 Thus, whether legislation effectuating Cassell's
proposal would pass constitutional muster is not an easy question.146
However, whether something like Cassell's proposal or some
other tape recording system is what the Miranda Court had in mind
when it "encourage [d] Congress to continue" its "laudable search for
increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of the individual
while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws"' 47 is a
question that need not detain us. Section 3501 does not contain a
video taping or audio taping requirement, or anything else even ar-
guably constituting an effective alternative to the Miranda safeguards.
142 Paul Cassell, Miranda's Social Costs: An Empirical Assessmen 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 387,
486 (1996).
143 See id. at 486-97. Professor Cassell, who has become the nation's leading critic bf
Miranda, was recently appointed by the U.S. Supreme Court to defend the constitutionality
of § 3501 in the Dickerson case.
144 StephenJ. Schulhofer, Miranda's Practical Effect: Substantial Benefits and Vanishingly
Small Social Costs, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 556, 556-60 (1996); see also Charles D. Weisselberg,
Saving Miranda, 84 CoRNss.L L. REV. 109, 166-67 (1998).
145 See YALE KAmmkR, Brewer v. Williams-A Hard Look at a Discomfiting Record, in Po-
LicF INTERROGATON, supra note 3, at 113, 129-37.
146 It is worth noting that testifying before the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of
Powers shortly after Congress passed the Crime Bill and a few days before the President
signed it, Professor Alexander Bickel, one of the leading constitutional law authorities of
his time, opined that if Congress had enacted "a different set of means than those adopted
by the [Miranda] Court--had required that all police interrogations "be put on tape"-he
found it "difficult to imagine that the Court would have stuck to its guns, that the Court
would have said no, the very means we invented are necessarily constitutional, and Con-
gress can't change them." The Supreme Court: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Separation of
Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judidaiy, 90th Cong. 28 (1968) (statement of Professor
Bickel) [hereinafter Senate Hearings on Separation of Powers].
147 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966).
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Section 3501 simply turns the clock back to the early 1960s, as if Mi-
randa had never been decided. 148
It is hard to see how anyone can seriously argue that the Miranda
Court encouraged or invited Congress to abolish Miranda in favor of
the very test the Court had explicitly and emphatically found inade-
quate to protect the rights of suspects. As Professor Charles Alan
Wright has said of § 3501: "It is one thing to devise alternative safe-
guards and quite another to provide, as the 1968 legislation does, that
no safeguards are needed."149
Another argument made in favor of § 3501 was that the Miranda
Court had not only disregarded precedent, but "misconstrue[d] the
Constitution." 50 Indeed, charged Senator McClellan, the Miranda
Court had "usurp[ed]" "the power to amend the Constitution" and
[i] t is that usurpation of power and its exercise here that we are truly
trying to correct."' 51 Congress, the argument went, had to "rectify 5-
to-4 court decisions, which have had the effect of amending the Con-
stitution"152 because (to quote Senator Ervin) Congress was the only
body that "can do anything to protect American people against deci-
sions like this, decisions which constitute a usurpation of power de-
nied to the majority of the Supreme Court by the very instrument they
profess to interpret."153
This argument, too, need not detain us for very long. If Congress
could overturn any Supreme Court interpretation of the Constitution
it disliked simply by calling the disliked ruling a "usurpation" by the
Court of the power to amend the Constitution, then the Constitution
would no longer be "superior paramount law," but "on a level with
ordinary legislative acts, and like other acts,... alterable when the
legislature shall please to alter it.'154
The most interesting argument on behalf of § 3501 made at the
time the Crime Bill was being debated and enacted was that Miranda
rested on an erroneous "factual assumption"-custodial interrogation
148 Whether § 3501 constitutes a "blending" of the voluntariness and Miranda tests or
whether it "recognizes" the Miranda rights is considered and rejected at infra text accompa-
nying notes 242-74.
149 WRiGHT, supra note 96, at 185.
150 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 50 (1968).
151 114 CONG. REc. 13,846 (1968); see also supra text accompanying note 78.
152 Id. at 13,849; see also supra text accompanying note 79.
153 Id. at 12,475; see also supra text accompanying note 82. During the hearings before
the Senate Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, hearings chaired by Senator Ervin and
held just before the President signed the Crime Bill, Ervin made a somewhat different
"usurpation" charge: "[T]he [Miranda] Court usurped the power of the legislature, the
Court prescribed rules of conduct to govern all law-enforcement officers having an accused
in custody, and in so doing it went clearly outside the words of the Constitution...." Senate
Hearings on Separation of Powers, supra note 146, at 28-29 (statement of Senator Ervin).
154 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803), quoted with approval in
Boeme v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 529 (1997).
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is "inherently coercive"-and that therefore Congress could remove
or correct Miranda's unsound factual "underpinning" and reassert the
traditional voluntariness test by "simple legislation." 155 As explained
by Senator Ervin, when he chaired the Senate subcommittee hearings
on separation of powers, the Legislative Reference Service memoran-
dum "suggests that the cases [Miranda and Wade] are based upon false
or unsound factual assumptions, and since these assumed facts don't
really exist, the Congress can pass a statute based upon its own find-
ings and do away with the rules notwithstanding that they were predi-
cated on constitutional grounds."156
As Professor Archibald Cox observed three decades ago, one re-
sponse to
the finding-of-fact defense of [§ 3501] is that it rests upon a miscon-
struction of the Miranda decision. The opinion, fairly read, does
not assert that police interrogation in the station house... is always
coercive unless the stated rules or their equivalent are satisfied.
Some of the language points in that direction... but the thrust of
the argument [in Miranda] seems to be that unless prophylactic
measures are employed there will be inadequate assurance that any
confession obtained in secret is not procured by compulsion violat-
ing the privilege against self-incrimination. The emphasis was on
the need for prophylactic rules rather than the compulsion present
in every case. 157
155 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 60, 63. At this point, the Senate Committee on the Judiciary
is reprinting and incorporating into its report a memorandum by the American Law Divi-
sion, Legislative Reference Service, Library of Congress. The memorandum, prepared at
the request of Senator Ervin, sets out the possible theories on which the constitutionality of
Title II could be sustained. See S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 53.
At one point, relying on Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the Legislative
Reference Service memorandum maintained that if a constitutional ruling is based upon a
"factual conclusion" by the Court, whether or not that conclusion is erroneous, "Congress
may undertake to mold constitutional policy by itself making [a different] factual determi-
nation." S. REp. No. 90-1097, at 63.
156 Senate Hearings on Separation of Powers, supra note 146, at 26 (statement of Senator
Ervin). However, Senator Ervin focused on a different "unsound factual assumption" than
had the Legislative Research Service. According to Ervin:
The Miranda case is based upon a factual assumption, namely that law-
enforcement officers in the United States are so bent on procuring convic-
tions of people they arrest that they can't be trusted to interrogate them as
they were for the first 166 years after the self-incrimination clause was put
into the Constitution....
... A decision of the Supreme Court, if it is based on a factual assump-
tion which is incorrect, may be subject to Congress' power to legislate. The
Supreme Court has no right to make constitutional determinations based
upon unsound factual assumptions. I don't believe the great majority of
law-enforcement officers in the United States are such disreputable people
that they have to have the criminals protected against them.
S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 24-25.
157 Archibald Cox, The Role of Congress in ConstitutionalDeterminations, 40 U. CQN. L. REv.
199, 250-51 (1971); see also 2 WAYNE R. LAFAvE, JEROLD H. ISRAEL & N cvJ. KrNG, CaNn-
NAL PRocEDuRE § 6.5(e) at 518 (2d ed. 1999); Burt, supra note 71, at 125 ("It is not at all
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Another response might be that § 3501 was not grounded on any
congressional findings of fact. As Professor Robert Burt points out,
"[a]s a general matter, it can be said that entire congressional debate
on all sides of Title II was notably devoid of anything but the most
speculative assertion of facts."158
Still another response to the finding-of-fact argument in support
of § 3501 is to ask what we mean by fact or factual. As Justice Frank-
furter once reminded us, "'Issue of fact' is a coat of many colors," one
that does not cover a conclusion "when that conclusion incorporates
standards of conduct or criteria for judgment which in themselves are
decisive of constitutional rights." 59
If one defines factual determinations and factual assumptions
loosely and broadly, the pre-Miranda, pre-Escobedo voluntariness test
was also based on factual determinations and factual assumptions. As
one close student of the pre-Miranda due process approach has re-
cently noted, in those days the "engine" that "drove the results in the
cases approving confessions... was constructed of assumptions about
the nature of coercion and beliefs about the particular kinds of coer-
cion that would influence most people to confess." 160
But were those assumptions and beliefs factual? Or were they
normative judgments?
Writing for an 8-1 majority in Miller v. Fenton,16 1 Justice O'Connor
pointed out that although the pre-Miranda confession cases framed
the issue in a variety of ways, "usually through the 'convenient short-
hand' of asking whether the confession was 'involuntary,'" the Court's
"longstanding position" has been that "'voluntariness' is a legal ques-
clear that the 'inherently coercive atmosphere' of custodial questioning was the only or the
central underpinning for Miranda.").
The same view of Miranda appears injustice Brennan's letter to ChiefJustice Warren,
commenting on a draft of the Miranda opinion. See Letter from Justice WilliamJ. Brennan
to ChiefJustice Earl Warren 9 (May 11, 1966) (on file with author) [hereinafter Brennan
Letter]. Brennan points out that since "police interrogation, as presently administered,
carries a substantial risk of testimonial compulsion," the Constitution requires both federal
and state governments to "incorporate appropriate safeguarding procedures in their inter-
rogation practices." Id. (emphasis added). Consider, too, Justice Powell's comments for a
7-2 majority in Colorado v. spring, 479 U.S. 564, 565 (1987):
The Miranda warnings protect [the privilege against self-incrimination] by
ensuring that a suspect knows that he may choose not to talk to law enforce-
ment officers, to talk only with counsel present, or to discontinue talking at
any time. The Miranda warnings ensure that a waiver of these rights is know-
ing and intelligent by requiring that the suspect be fully advised of the con-
stitutional privilege, including the critical advice that whatever he chooses
to say may be used as evidence against him.
Id. at 574 (emphasis added).
158 Burt, supra note 71, at 126.
159 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949).
160 Catherine Hancock, Due Process Before Miranda, 70 TuL. L. REv. 2195, 2216 (1996).
161 474 U.S. 104, 109 (1985).
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tion meriting independent consideration in a federal habeas corpus
proceeding.' 62 She continued:
[T]he Court's consistently held view [has been] that the admissibil-
ity of a confession turns as much on whether the techniques for
extracting the statements, as applied to this suspect, are compatible
with a system that presumes innocence and assures that a conviction
will not be secured by inquisitorial means as on whether the defen-
dant's will was in fact overborne. 163
Fifty-six years ago, in the famous case of Ashcraft v. Tennessee,164
the Court held that thirty-six continuous hours of police questioning
was "so inherently coercive" that no resulting confession could be vol-
untary, and that the situation in which the suspect was placed was "ir-
reconcilable" with a voluntary confession. 165 Could Congress have
overturned Ashcraft in federal or state cases by finding the factual as-
sumption on which it was based unsound and then correcting it?
It seems silly to ask that question today, but it would not have
seemed silly at the time. Justice Jackson, joined by Justices Roberts
and Frankfurter, wrote a powerful dissent in Ashcraft, protesting that
the Court "substitutes for determination on conflicting evidence the
question whether this confession was actually produced by coercion, a
presumption that it was, on a new doctrine that examination in cus-
tody of this duration is 'inherently coercive"' and that "it makes that
presumption irrebuttable.' 66 Jackson suggested that Mr. Ashcraft was
one of those strong men who could "withstand for days pressure that
would destroy the will of another in hours"' 67 and he emphasized that
"the evidence shows that ... the confession when made was deliber-
ate, free, and voluntary in the sense in which that term is used in crim-
inal law."' 68 "[T]he ultimate question," maintained Jackson, has
been, and should be, whether, regardless of the circumstances, the
particular suspect who confessed "was in possession of his own will
and self-control at the time of confession."1 69
162 Id. at 115.
163 Id. at 116; see also YALE K~rsAIR, What Is an "Involuntary" Confession?, in PoLICE IN-
TERROGATION, supra note 3, at 1, 14; Paul M. Bator & James Vorenberg, Arrest, Detention,
Interrogation and the Right to Counsel: Basic Problems and Possible Legislative Solutions, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 62, 73 (1966).
164 322 U.S. 143 (1944).
165 Id. at 154.
166 Id. at 156, 157 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
167 Id. at 162 (Jackson, J, dissenting).
168 Id. at 163-64 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
169 Id. at 162 (Jackson, J., dissenting). Hancock points out that
Asheraft was a milestone because it prefigured Miranda's recognition of the
coercion inherent in all custodial interrogation.... In a prophetic dictum
[a dissenting Justice Jackson] declared that 'even one hour' of interroga-
tion would be inherently coercive, and so there could be no stopping point
to the Ashcraft doctrine. However, more than twenty years elapsed before
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"The answer to Justice Jackson's objection," observes ProfessorJo-
seph Grano, one of the nation's leading authorities on police interro-
gation and confessions, "lies in the component elements of the
voluntariness inquiry."170 "The first element," continues Grano, "re-
quires a normative judgment at the constitutional level about the in-
terrogation conduct of the police." 71
But why can't the same thing be said of Miranda? The Miranda
Court held that the privilege against self-incrimination applies not
only to the proceedings in a courtroom or before a legislative commit-
tee, but to the "informal compulsion exerted by law-enforcement of-
ficers during in-custody questioning."' 72 Everything else in Miranda
follows from this.
In-custody interrogation as practiced at the time-without advis-
ing the suspect of his rights and the consequences of waiving them-
"is at odds" with the privilege.' 73 When an individual is taken into
custody and subjected to questioning, the privilege is 'jeopardized" 174
and "procedural safeguards must be employed" to protect it.'7 5 "Even
without employing brutality, the 'third degree' or the specific strata-
gems described [in the police manuals], the very fact of custodial in-
terrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the
weakness of individuals."' 76
Unless the Miranda warnings or equally effective alternative safe-
guards are utilized, there can be no "assurance of real understanding
and intelligent exercise of the privilege"' 77 and no assurance that "the
individual's right to choose between silence and speech remains un-
fettered throughout the interrogation process.' 78 Now that the privi-
lege applies to in-custody interrogation, it is no longer acceptable for
the police to question suspects as they did in the past-acting as if
this prophecy came to pass in the form of Mirandds presumption that even
a few moments of custodial interrogation are inherently coercive.
Hancock, supra note 160, at 2226 (footnotes omitted); see also KAMisAR, supra note 92, at 97-
102.
170 JOSEPH D. GRANo, CoNI EssioNs, TRUTH, AND THE LAW 104 (1993).
171 Id.; see also id. at 105 ("A more sensible reading of Ashcraft-and one that preserves
the significance of voluntariness terminology-is that fundamentally inappropriate police
conduct did in fact put pressure on (cause) the defendant to confess, something he did
not want to do."). Cf Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 51 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.) ("But 'issue
of fact' is a coat of many colors. It does not cover a conclusion drawn from uncontroverted
happenings, when that conclusion incorporates standards of conduct or criteria for judg-
ment which in themselves are decisive of constitutional rights.").
172 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461, 467 (1966) (noting the "inherently compel-
ling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist").
173 Id. at 457-58.
174 Id. at 478.
175 Id. at 478-79.
176 Id. at 455.
177 Id, at 469.
178 Id.
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they had a right to an answer and leading suspects to think that it will
be so much the worse for them if they did not answer. Moreover, now
that the privilege applies to in-custody interrogation, it would be
anomalous not to make custodial suspects aware of their rights-as
defendants in more formal settings are made aware of their rights-
when "the compulsion to speak in the isolated setting of the police
station may well be greater than in courts or other official investiga-
tions, where there are often impartial observers to guard against in-
timidation or trickery." 79
One may disagree with the reasoning of the Court (as many
have), but surely Miranda is based more on an interpretation of the
self-incrimination clause and a judgment about how to strike the ap-
propriate balance between the needs of law enforcement and the
rights of custodial suspects'80 than on any "factual determination" or
"factual assumption." Surely Senator McClellan's and Senator Ervin's
disagreement with the Miranda Court "is theoretical, not
empirical."18
It is fair to say-as the Supreme Court has said-that a "complex
of values" underlies the due process-"totality of circum-
stances"-voluntariness test.'8 2 I do not see why the same may not be
said for the underpinning of the Miranda doctrine. As a keen student
of Miranda has recently observed: "One cannot read the majority
opinion in Miranda to describe anything other than a normative vision
about the constitutional limits on a custodial interrogation." 8 3
179 Id. at 461. Cf Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143, 154 (1944). The Court in Ash-
craft stated:
It is inconceivable that any court ofjustice in the land, conducted as our
courts are, open to the public, would permit prosecutors serving in relays to
keep a defendant witness under continuous cross-examination for thirty-six
hours.... Nor can we, consistently with Constitutional due process of law,
hold voluntary a confession where prosecutors do the same thing away from
the restraining influence of a public trial in an open court room.
Id.
180 Cf Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 426-27, 433 n.4 (1986) (O'ConnorJ.) ("As any
reading of Miranda reveals, the decision, rather than proceeding from the premise that the
rights and needs of the defendant are paramount to all others, embodies a carefully
crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defendant's and society's interests.").
181 Cf Deborah Jones Merritt, Constitutional Fact and Theory: A Response to Chief Judge
Posner, 97 MxcH. L. REv. 1287, 1289 (1999) ("The dispute lies in the realm of theory, not
fact.").
182 Blackburn v. Alabama, 361 U.S. 199, 207 (1960); see also Schneckloth v. Busta-
mente, 412 U.S. 218, 224-225 (1973) (noting that " 'voluntariness' has reflected an accom-
modation of the complex of values implicated in police questioning of a suspect").
183 Weisselberg, supra note 144, at 123. Weisselberg adds that:
The Court included in Miranda the long, didactic passages about the his-
tory of the Fifth Amendment, about interrogation techniques, about evolv-
ing police practices, about the impact of questioning upon minorities, and
about the role of counsel not only to support the Court's legal conclusions,
but also to persuade the police and the public.
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The line between a factual assumption and a value judgment is
not always easy to discern. For example, at first glance the issues of
when human life begins and what is a person may look like questions
of fact. As Professor Laurence Tribe has pointed out, however,
"[s]uch questions [call] at bottom for normative judgments no less
profound than those involved in defining 'liberty' or 'equality."1" 84
If Congress could overturn a constitutional ruling by legislation
simply by removing or correcting what it calls the unsound factual
determination or factual assumption on which it claims the constitu-
tional ruling is based, then Congress would possess "the power to de-
termine what constitutes a constitutional violation"18 5 and "[s]hifting
legislative majorities could change the Constitution and effectively cir-
cumvent the difficult and detailed amendment process contained in
Article V."186
In Furman v. Georgia,l8 7 a 5-4 majority, per curiam, held that the
imposition and carrying out of the death penalty under statutes
before the Court, as they were then administered, constituted "cruel
and unusual" punishment in violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendments. As a result, the laws of thirty-nine states and various
federal statutory provisions were struck down. Each of the justices
wrote a separate concurring or dissenting opinion explaining his rea-
sons for invalidating or upholding the death penalty.188 But the piv-
otal opinions were written by Justices Stewart and White.
Id.
184 WiLLIAM B. LOCKHART ET AL, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES-COMMENTS-QUESTIONS
1489 (8th ed. 1996) (quoting a statement made by Laurence Tribe at a Senate hearing on
a "Human Life" Bill); see also Irving A. Gordon, The Nature and Use of Congressional Power
under Section Five of the Fourte enth Amendment to Overcome Decisions of the Supreme Court, 72 Nw.
U. L. REv. 656, 691 (1977). Professor Gordon maintains the following:
Congress has power to overturn the empirical findings of the Court; but it
can do so only as long as it does not infringe on the normative component
of the judicial decision. Were Congress to make an empirical "finding" that
an abortion procedure that was difficult or relatively unavailable was safer,
thereby banning the generally available one, its legislation could not stand.
In that case, its normative finding would undermine the normative princi-
ple of the woman's autonomy over her body.
Professors Gordon and Tribe are both discussing generally the power of Congress
under Section Five of the Fourteenth Amendment, and § 3501 deals only with Miranda in
federal criminal prosecutions, but their comments seem equally applicable to attempts to
overturn or to modify Supreme Court rulings in the federal courts. See U.S. CONST. amend.
XIV, § 5.
185 Cf Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 519 (1999) ("[Congress] has been given the
power 'to enforce,' not the power to determine what constitutes a constitutional
violation.").
186 Id. at 529.
187 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam).
188 Furman has been called "a badly orchestrated opera, with nine characters taking
turns to offer their own arias." Robert Weisberg, DeregulatingDeath, 1983 Sup. CT. REv. 305,
315.
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Justice Stewart thought the death sentences before the Court
were "cruel and unusual in the same way that being struck by lighten-
ing is cruel and unusual."18 9 Of all the criminal defendants convicted
of murder in recent years, "the petitioners are among a capriciously
selected random handful upon whom the sentence of death has in
fact been imposed."190 He concluded that "the Eighth and Four-
teenth Amendments cannot tolerate the infliction of a sentence of
death under legal systems that permit the unique penalty to be so
wantonly and so freakishly imposed."191
According to Justice White, "as the statutes before us are now ad-
ministered, the [death] penalty is so infrequently imposed that the
threat of execution is too attenuated to be of substantial service to
criminal justice."' 92 Moreover, "based on 10 years of almost daily ex-
posure to the facts and circumstances" of many cases involving crimes
for which death was the authorized penalty, Justice White concluded
that "there is no meaningful basis for distinguishing the few cases in
which [the death penalty] is imposed from the many cases in which it
is not."'193
Four years later, the Court upheld a number of post-Furman capi-
tal-sentencing procedures, 194 concluding that these newly-drafted stat-
utes satisfied "the concerns expressed in Furman that the penalty of
death not be imposed in an arbitrary or capricious manner."195
But what if the states and the federal government had not drafted
new statutes designed to meet the concerns expressed in Furman?
What if the states and the federal government had stood pat? If Con-
gress can overturn Miranda legislatively by correcting the unsound
"factual assumptions" on which it is based, why could Congress not
treat Furman the same way?
It would have been no great feat to invite "representatives of what
might be called the 'law enforcement lobby""196 to present anecdotal
evidence or to cite a prosecutor's survey (as was done in the wake of
Miranda) undercutting the "factual underpinnings" of Stewart's and
White's pivotal Furman opinions. We have a pretty good idea of how
such testimony would have run. For a year after Furman the President
of the National District Attorneys Association, Texas prosecutor Carol
Vance, sought to assure the public (as he would have sought to assure
189 Furman, 408 U.S. at 309 (Stewart, J., concurring).
190 Id at 309-10 (Stewart, J., concurring).
191 Id. at 310 (Stewart, J., concurring).
192 Id. at 313 (White, J., concurring).
193 Id. (White, J., concurring)
194 SeeJurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976); Proffitt v. Florida, 428 U.S. 242 (1976);
Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
195 Gregg, 428 U.S. at 195 (plurality opinion).
196 See supra text accompanying note 90.
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a Senate subcommittee calling upon him to testify on the subject) that
those sentenced to death do not constitute "a capriciously selected
random handful," the death penalty is not "wantonly" and "freakishly"
imposed, and there is a "meaningful basis" for distinguishing the few
murder cases in which the death penalty is imposed from the many
murder cases in which it is not:
Actually there is a fairly universal consensus on which cases
should receive the harshest penalties.... It is only in the bizarre
murder, the killing for hire or during another serious crime, and a
few other isolated instances that the people of this country want to
see the death penalty applied. And these crimes are a small per-
centage of the overall murders. The prosecutors of Texas (as well as
any judge or defense attorney) can listen to a set of facts and tell
you whether it is a death penalty case....
The truth of the matter is that there should be very few death
penalty sentences. Only a very few cases warrant this extreme mea-
sure. It takes two essential ingredients... : (1) overwhelming proof
of the defendant's guilt and (2) an extremely aggravated fact situa-
tion. What is so surprising is Justice White's and Justice Stewart's
conclusion that there is something highly improper in so few peo-
ple receiving the death penalty.197
Not all post-Furman capital-sentencing procedures passed consti-
tutional muster. The same day it upheld new statutes in Gregg and
companion cases, the Court invalidated post-Furman mandatory death
sentence statutes. 198
A "separate deficiency" of North Carolina's mandatory death stat-
ute was "its failure to provide a constitutionally tolerable response to
Furman's rejection of unbridled jury discretion in the imposition of
capital sentences." 199 How could a jury exercise "unbridled discre-
tion" when it was applying a mandatory death sentence? In light of
the historic jury resistance to mandatory death penalties, the plurality
thought it "only reasonable to assume"200 that many juries-despite
their oaths-would use discretion in imposing the death penalty and
the mandatory death penalty statute "provides no standards to guide
the jury in its inevitable exercise of the power to determine which
first-degree murderers shall live and which shall die."20'
197 Carol S. Vance, The Death Penalty After Furman, 48 No= DAME L. REv. 850, 858
(1973).
198 SeeWoodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280 (1976); Roberts v. Louisiana, 428 U.S.
325 (1976).
199 Woodson, 428 U.S. at 302.
200 Id. at 303.
201 Id.
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If Congress can overrule Miranda by simple legislation because it
is based on an unsound factual assumption, then it can overturn the
mandatory death penalty cases by the same route. I venture to say it
would not be difficult for Congress to find witnesses who would testify
that juries do not (or no longer) resist mandatory death penalties in
murder cases and do not (or no longer) violate their oaths in
mandatory death penalty cases by exercising discretion in deciding
which murderers "shall live and which shall die."
The mandatory death sentence cases did not mark the only time
the Court concluded that the jury could not be expected to follow the
court's instructions. One need only recall a famous confession case,
Jackson v. Denno.202
In accordance with the then-prevailing NewYork practice, when a
question was raised about the voluntariness of the defendant's confes-
sion, the trial court submitted that issue, along with the other issues in
the case, to the jury. The court told the jury that "if it found the con-
fession involuntary, it was to disregard it entirely, and determine guilt
or innocence solely from the other evidence in the case; alternatively,
if it found the confession voluntary, it was to determine its truth or
reliability and afford it weight accordingly."203
The Court, per Justice White, concluded that the New York pro-
cedure utilized in the case "did not adequately protectJackson's right
to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced confession and there-
fore cannot withstand constitutional attack."20 4
The NewYorkjury is at once given both the evidence going to
voluntariness and all of the corroborating evidence showing that
the confession is true and that the defendant committed the crime.
The jury may therefore believe the confession and believe that the
defendant has committed the very act with which he is charged, a
circumstance which may seriously distort judgment of the credibility
of the accused and assessment of the testimony concerning the criti-
cal facts surrounding his confession.
In those cases where without the confession the evidence is in-
sufficient, the defendant should not be convicted if the jury believes
the confession but finds it to be involuntary. The jury however may
find it difficult to understand the policy forbidding reliance upon a
coerced, but true, confession .... That a trustworthy confession
must also be voluntary if it is to be used at all, generates natural and
potent pressure to find it voluntary. Otherwise the guilty defendant
goes free. Objective consideration of the conflicting evidence con-
202 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
203 Id. at 374-75.
204 Id. at 377.
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cerning the circumstances of the confession becomes difficult and
the implicit findings become suspect.20 5
[The alternative assumption]-that the jury found the confes-
sion involuntary and disregarded it-is equally unacceptable.
Under the NewYork procedure, the fact of a defendant's confession
is solidly implanted in the jury's mind, for it has not only heard the
confession, but it has been instructed to consider and judge its vol-
untariness and is in position to assess whether it is true or false. If it
finds the confession involuntary, does the jury-indeed, can it-
then disregard the confession in accordance with its instructions? If
there are lingering doubts about the sufficiency of the other evi-
dence, does the jury unconsciously lay them to rest by resort to the
confession? ....
It is difficult, if not impossible, to prove that a confession which
a jury has found to be involuntary has nevertheless influenced the
verdict or that its finding of voluntariness, if this is the course it
took, was affected by the other evidence showing the confession was
true. But the New York procedure poses substantial threats to a de-
fendant's constitutional rights to have the coercion issue fairly and
reliably determined. These hazards we cannot ignore.20 6
Jackson v. Denno is filled with what might loosely be called factual
assumptions. (I would call them the judgments and insights of the
Justices based on decades of experience as lawyers and judges and
decades of studying and thinking about the legal system.) If Congress
could overrule Miranda by simple legislation because the case is based
on unsound "factual assumptions," then surely it could overrule Jack-
son v. Denno as well.
20 7
205 Id. at 381-82 (citation omitted).
206 Id. at 388-89.
207 Cf Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968). Bruton holds that where the con-
fession of one codefendant contains references to a second codefendant and the first code-
fendant declines to take the stand in his own defense, the use of the confession in ajoint
trial violates the second codefendant's Sixth Amendment right of confrontation despite in-
structions to the jury that the confession constitutes admissible evidence only against the
confessor. See id. at 135-36 (Brennan, J.). The Bruton Court explained that
as was recognized in Jackson v. Denno, there are some contexts in which the
risk that the jury will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant, that the practical and
human limitations of the jury system cannot be ignored. Such a context is
presented here, where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial state-
ments of a codefendant, who stands accused side-by-side with the defen-
dant, are deliberately spread before the jury in a joint trial.
Id. (Brennan, J.).
But the difference between whether ajury will not or cannot follow instructions, and
when it will and can do so, may certainly be called factual determinations or factual as-
sumptions. For a discussion of Bruton and its progeny, see LAFAvE, IsRAEL, & KING, supra
note 157, § 17.2(b).
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And what of the Court's statement in Brown v. Board of Education
that "[s] eparate educational facilities are inherently unequal"?20 The
Brown Court also told us that separating children "from others of simi-
lar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feel-
ing of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."20 9
If statements in Miranda that "the very fact of custodial interroga-
tion exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weak-
ness of individuals,"210 the interrogation atmosphere "carries its own
badge of intimidation," 21' "[t]he current practice of incommunicado
interrogation is at odds with" the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion,212 and "[u] nless adequate protective devices are employed to dis-
pel the compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement
obtained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice"2 13 are factual determinations or assumptions that can be reex-
amined and corrected by Congress in the form of legislation abolish-
ing the ruling, then the same may be said about the Brown case.
It is worth recalling how Professor Alexander Bickel responded
when Senator Ervin suggested that since Miranda and Wade are "based
upon false or unsound factual assumptions," "the Congress can pass a
statute based upon its own findings and do away with the rules"2 14:
[I] t is not quite enough to refer to the factual bases of Supreme
Court decisions and be willing to let Congress override those, be-
cause the realm of fact probably covers most of what there is....
Certainly [Brown] is based on a factual finding, both as to the
nature of education, what it does, and more at large as to the nature
of society and what State-imposed racial destinations have to do with
it. These are factual matters.
Similarly in Miranda there are facts more at large to which the
Supreme Court could retreat. The answer could be no, we don't
think every policeman tries to administer the third degree to every
prisoner. We believe that in the station house situation, there is a
natural unintended effect of overbearing the prisoner. That is a
factual premise, but I suppose it is too near to the core of the consti-
208 Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954).
209 Id. at 494. I agree with Professor Merritt, see Merritt, supra note 181, at 1293, that
the statements from Brown quoted in the text are "social conclusion[s]" reached after "a
complex intellectual journey," but they may also loosely be called "factual premises" or
"factual assumptions."
210 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 455 (1966).
211 Id. at 457.
212 Id. at 457-58.
213 Id. at 458.
214 Senate Hearings on Separation of Powers, supra note 146, at 26 (statement of Professor
Bickel). These hearings, chaired by Senator Ervin, should be distinguished from those
chaired by Senator McClellan. The Ervin hearings touched upon, but did not concentrate
on, § 3501.
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tutional proposition that if you allow that to be overruled, what is
left of the function ofjudicial review? 2 15
B. Arguments Made in the Post-Warren Court Era
In June of 1969, the Department ofJustice (DOJ), now headed by
Attorney General John Mitchell, made a valiant effort to defend the
constitutionality of § 3501. With Mitchell's authorization, a memoran-
dum "consistent with President Nixon's frequent criticism of Warren
Court decisions on interrogation and related aspects of police proce-
dure"216 was sent to all United States Attorneys. It explained why "the
failure to give the warnings required by Miranda will not necessarily
require exclusion of a resulting confession."21 7
The DOJ memorandum emphasized that the Miranda Court re-
quired "some 'system' to safeguard against inherently compulsive cir-
cumstances," not any "particular system. 218 This is true, but § 3501
does not establish any system to protect against inherent compul-
sion-other than the pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda voluntariness test
which the Court found inadequate.
"Since these specific warnings are not themselves constitutional
absolutes," continued the DOJ, "the determination by Congress-that
their absence in a case should not entail an inflexible imposition of
the exclusionary rule-is within the power of Congress."21 9 To be
sure, the Miranda warnings are not "constitutional absolutes" in the
sense that another set of procedural safeguards might constitute a suit-
able substitute, but § 3501 does not provide another set of safe-
guards-it only reinstates the voluntariness test. Wy, then, is § 3501
"within the power of Congress"?
The DOJ memorandum goes on to say that § 3501 "clearly recog-
nizes that a statement.., must be made with awareness of the individ-
ual's Fifth Amendment rights .... ,220 But § 3501 does no such thing.
It directs the districtjudge to "take into consideration," along with "all
other circumstances surrounding the giving of the confession,"
215 Id. at 27.
216 STEPENS, supra note 40, at 164.
217 Memorandum from the Department ofJustice to the United States Attorneys (June
11, 1969), 5 Crim. L. Rep. (BNA) 2350 (1969) (hereinafter DOJ Memorandum].
I am indebted to Professor Lawrence Herman for first calling this memorandum to my
attention. As Professor Herman points out, at the time the memorandum appeared future
Justice William Rehnquist headed the Office of Legal Counsel. See Lawrence Herman, The
Supreme Court, the Attorney Genera4 and the Good Old Days of Police Interrogation, 48 OHIO ST.
L.J. 733, 738-39 n. 44 (1987). I know of no evidence that the memorandum was drafted in
the Office of Legal Counsel, but it would not be surprising if the Office had at least been
consulted when the memorandum was prepared.
218 DOJ Memorandum, supra note 217, at 2351.
219 Id. at 2351-52
220 Id. at 2352.
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whether a defendant was advised of her right to remain silent and her
right to the assistance of counsel.22 ' But it allows the trial judge to
admit the confession into evidence even though the suspect neither
knew nor was advised of her rights. 222 For "the presence or absence"
of any of the factors the trial judge is supposed to take into considera-
tion "need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession."223
Moreover, § 3501 does nothing to assure that an individual giving
a statement is made aware of her Fifth Amendment rights. For the
statute is directed at the trial judge who is to determine the admissibil-
ity of a confession, not at the police interrogator. It does not require
the police to tell a custodial suspect anything.
Finally, the DOJ memorandum states that "Congress has reason-
ably directed" that a confession be excluded "only where the constitu-
tional privilege itself has been violated, but not where a protective
safeguard system suggested by the Court has been violated in a partic-
ular case without affecting the privilege itself."22 4 This language
drives a wedge between the Miranda warnings and the privilege-as
does similar language in subsequent Supreme Court opinions2 25 -but
it is quite misleading.
The DOJ itself recognizes, earlier in its memorandum, that
although Miranda did not find "a particular system" of procedural safe-
guards "necessary" to protect the privilege, it was "some 'system' to safe-
guard against inherently compulsive circumstances which the Court
found necessary under the Constitution."2 2 6 When the only system to
safeguard against inherently compulsive circumstances is violated-
and § 3501 does not provide any other-the privilege against self-in-
crimination is affected.
As anyone familiar with the legislative history of Tide II (dis-
cussed at considerable length earlier in this Article) is likely to con-
clude, there is a fictitious air about the DOJ memorandum's benign
reading of § 3501. There is much talk in the memorandum about
meeting "the requirements of the privilege" without complying with
Miranda,22 7 "whether a breach of a protective measure result[s] in an
actual breach of the privilege itself,"2 2 8 and how § 3501 recognizes
221 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b) (1994).
222 See id. ("The presence or absence of any of the above-mentioned factors to be taken
into consideration by the judge need not be conclusive on the issue of voluntariness of the
confession.").
223 Id.; see also supra note 2 (reprinting the text of § 3501).
224 DOJ Memorandum, supra note 217, at 2352.
225 See infra text accompanying notes 278-98.
226 DOJ Memorandum, supra note 217, at 2351.
227 Id.
228 Id. at 2352.
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that a statement "must be made with awareness of the individual's
Fifth Amendment rights."229 I doubt that anyone who had only read
the DOJ memorandum, not the text of § 3501 as well, would have any
idea that § 3501 never mentions the privilege or the Fifth Amendment
or the self-incrimination clause.2 0
The reasons for this silence are not hard to apprehend. The pro-
ponents of § 3501 were not trying to satisfy the requirements of the
privilege. They were not interested in the privilege. They did not be-
lieve the privilege should have any bearing on the admissibility of
confessions.231
As the report of the Senate Judiciary Committee makes plain, the
proponents of § 3501 maintained that the "traditional right of the
people to have their prosecuting attorneys place in evidence before
juries the voluntary confessions and incriminating statements made by
defendants simply must be restored."232 As they viewed § 3501, it "re-
flect[ed] the historical rule governing admissibility of a confession," 233
a rule whose "balancing of the rights of society and the rights of the
individual" had "served us well over the years." 23 4 The instructions to
the trial judge to "take into consideration" the "circumstances sur-
rounding the giving of the confession" (including whether the suspect
knew or had been advised of his rights) 23 5 were not designed to ac-
commodate Miranda; these circumstances were simply those the trial
229 Id.
230 See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1994); see also supra note 2 (reprint the text of § 3501).
231 Consider, for example, the following exchange between Senator Ervin and Judge
Lumbard:
SEN. ERVIN: [T]aking the language of the self-incrimination clause, it
would seem to have no application whatever to a voluntary confession; is
that not true?
JUDGE LuM ai: I think I would agree with that. That is my own per-
sonal view.
SEN. ERVIN: [U]nder the language of the [F]ifth [A]mendment, it
would seem that the plain English words there have a clear meaning and
that they could have no application to a voluntary statement made by a
person in the custody of an officer, because he is not a witness in any legal
sense.
JUDGE LuMBARD: This is exactly the arguments that States made in the
Miranda case.
SEN. ERVIN: In summary, don't you agree with me that just from the
standpoint of assigning to the English language the true meaning of these
words, that it is quite an intellectual feat to say that the self-incrimination
clause could have any application to a voluntary confession?
JUDGE LussamAR: I agree with your point of view, Senator, and I said so
in some opinions which I wrote for our court prior to the Miranda case.
Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 189-90 (statement of Senator Ervin and Judge Lumbard).
232 S. REP. No. 90-1097, at 37, 47, 51, 53 (1968).
233 Id. at 47.
234 Id. at 51.
235 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b).
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court had previously taken, and was to continue to take, into account
"in determining the issue of voluntariness, including specifically enu-
merated factors which historically enter into such a determination."236
As Senator McClellan told one witness, passage of the bill he in-
troduced "would be tantamount to restoring the longstanding, tradi-
tional procedures." 23 7 As he told another witness, if his bill were
enacted into law he hoped that the Supreme Court would change its
mind and uphold the law, thereby "restor[ing] the law regarding con-
fessions to what it has been throughout the history of the Nation."238
The "corrective legislation" he was proposing, McClellan told the Sen-
ate, "would bring about a complete restoration of the sound rule
which allows the admissibility of a confession of an accused if it is vol-
untarily made."23 9 At another point he asked how a "civilized society"
should determine the admissibility of a confession and quickly sup-
plied the answer:
If [the trial judge] concludes [the confession] was the voluntary act
of the defendant, he should admit it and then permit the jury to
hear all the evidence as to the circumstances of the giving of the
confession or statement, with instructions that it be given such
weight as the jury may feel it is entitled to receive. In short, the
totality of the circumstances is the true and should be the only test
for the court in determining voluntariness and the admissibility of a
confession.240
236 S. REP. No. 90-1097, supra note 20, at 51; see also infra text accompanying notes 266-
74.
237 Senate Hearings, supra note 20, at 1174 (statement of Senator McClellan).
238 Id. at 194 (statement of Senator McClellan).
239 114 CONG. REc. 11,207 (1968).
240 114 CONG. REc. 13,848. Howeverjust before the Senate was to vote on a motion to
strike § 3501 (a motion that failed), Senator McClellan told the president of the Senate
that "this division has to do with the Miranda decision and says that the Miranda case shall
be taken into consideration by the trial judge in determining whether a statement is volun-
tary and if he determines that the confession is voluntary, he then submits it to the
jury...." 114 CONG. REc. 14,171-72. Thejudge, continued McClellan, "must find himself,
out of the presence of the jury, that [the confession] was voluntarily made, without coer-
cion and without intimidation." Id. The following exchange then occurred:
SEN. LAUSCHE: Mr. President, does the Senator's statement embody
what has been the law for more than 170 years?
SEN. McCLLuLAN: The Senator is correct.
SEN. LAUSCHE: I refer to the fact that the judge hears the testimony,
determines whether the confession is voluntary and in conformity with the
Miranda pronouncements, and then also submits it to the jury to likewise
make a determination as to whether it is voluntary?
SEN. McCLELLAN: The Senator is correct.
SEN. LAUSCHE: And that began in 1787?
SEN. McCILuAN: The Senator is correct.
Id. at 14,172.
This exchange is quite confusing. Obviously, trial judges determining the voluntari-
ness of a confession had not taken into account "for more than 170 years" or since 1787
whether the confession was obtained "in conformity with the Miranda pronouncements."
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As did the Department of Justice in 1969, the Fourth Circuit
panel that decided Dickerson would have us believe that there is a cer-
tain rapport between § 3501 and Miranda. Thus, perhaps responding
to the Justice Department's arguments that "Congress cannot be
deemed to have taken advantage of' the Court's invitation to develop
alternatives to Miranda because § 3501 "simply relegated warnings
back to their pre-Miranda status,"241 the Fourth Circuit considered it
"important to note" that-
Congress did not completely abandon the central holding of Mi-
randa, i.e., the four warnings are important safeguards in protecting
the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination. Indeed,
§ 3501 specifically lists the Miranda warnings as factors that a district
court should consider when determining whether a confession was
voluntarily given.242
First of all, § 3501 has nothing to say about one of the Miranda
warnings: whether the suspect was told that if he could not afford a
lawyer but wanted one, a lawyer would be provided for him prior to
any questioning.243 More important, § 3501 does not list any warnings
or require any warnings; the section only directs the trial judge to consider
certain factors when determining the voluntariness of a confession.
Still more important, although to somebody who has not read or re-
read the pre-Miranda confession cases recently, the factors listed in
§ 3501 do look like something resembling the Miranda warnings, they
are not. They are not even emanations from Miranda. They are sim-
ply some of the many components of the pre-Miranda voluntariness
test.
Id. Moreover, if § 3501 did require the trial judge to do that, it would defeat the frequently
stated purpose of the provision-to overturn Miranda or, at least, to get the Court to recon-
sider the decision.
In any event, this is the only statement by Senator McClellan I came across suggesting
he believed that under § 3501 the trial judge determining the admissibility of a confession
is supposed to take into consideration the Miranda case-and it is inconsistent with many
other statements McClellan made about the meaning and purpose of § 3501. Senator
Lausche's questions to Senator McClellan are even more puzzling. Why would he support
a bill requiring the trial judge to determine whether the confession is obtained "in con-
formity" with Miranda when earlier the same day he charged that the Miranda Court had
.amended the Constitution in nonconformity with the procedure set forth in that sacred
document specifying how amendments shall be made"-had "usurped the powers reserved
to the people, the Congress, and the separate State legislatures." Id. at 14,139. Moreover,
Senator Lausche had testified at the Senate subcommittee hearings that "[fIor 177 years
... no one ever thought of this Miranda principle" and "if law and order is to be main-
mined the Congress should take action to nullify that decision." Senate Hearings, supra note
20, at 141 (statement of Senator Lausche).
241 Supplemental Brief for the United States at 13, United States v. Leong, 116 F.3d
1474 (4th Cir. 1997) (No. 96-4876).
242 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 687 (4th Cir.), cert. granted, 120 S. Ct. 275
(1999).
243 See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966).
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Section 3501(b) does list numerous factors that the trial judge
"shall take into consideration," including whether or not the suspect
has been advised of his rights, but goes on to say that "the presence or
absence of any of [these] factors ... need not be conclusive on the
issue of the voluntariness of the confession."244 The operative words
are "take into consideration" and "factors." This statute adds nothing
to the pre-Miranda voluntariness test. As Judge Henry Friendly noted
a year before Miranda was handed down, "lack of counsel and of ad-
vice that a suspect might wish to consult counsel before making a
statement are always factors to be weighed in determining the volunta-
riness of a confession-a concept that has broadened far beyond phys-
ical coercion."245
Judge Friendly was a leading critic of the Warren Court's "revolu-
tion" in American criminal procedure. The most forceful critic of Es-
cobedo and Miranda on the Court was Justice Byron White. He, no less
than Judge Friendly, was well aware of the nature and scope of the
pre-Miranda voluntariness test. Defending the test against growing at-
tack, dissenting Justice White observed in Escobedo:
The Court may be concerned with . . . the unknowing defendant
who responds to police questioning because he mistakenly believes
that he must and that his admissions will not be used against him.
But this worry hardly calls for the broadside the Court has now
fired. The failure to inform an accused that he need not answer
and that his answers may be used against him is very relevant indeed
to whether the disclosures are compelled .... When the accused
has not been informed of his rights at all the Court characteristically
244 18 U.S.C. § 3501(b); see also supra note 2 (reprinting the text of § 3501).
245 HENRYJ. FRIENDLY, The Bill of Rights as a Code of Criminal Procedure, in BENCHMARKS,
supra note 1, at 235, 249 (emphasis added). This is probably an overstatement. Lack of
counsel and advice about counsel were probably not factors in the 1930s, but emerged as
significant factors as the voluntariness test evolved and became more demanding. Thus, in
the last of the pre-Escobedo, pre-Miranda confession cases, Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S.
503 (1963), a 5-4 majority, through Justice Goldberg, observed:
The jury was instructed, in effect, not to consider as relevant on the issue of
voluntariness of the confession the fact that a defendant is not reminded
that he is under arrest, that he may remain silent, that he is not cautioned
that he may remain silent, that he is not warned that his answers may be
used against him, or that he is not advised that he is entitled to counsel.
Whatever independent consequences these factors may otherwise have,
they are unquestionably attendant circumstances which the accused is enti-
tled to have appropriately considered in determining voluntariness and ad-
missibility of his confession.
Id. at 516-17.
WhatJudge Friendly may have meant was that after Haynes, it was clear that whether a
suspect had counsel or was advised of his right to consult with counsel (or of his right to
remain silent) were always going to be significant factors in deciding whether a confession
was voluntary.
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and properly looks very closely at the surrounding circumstances. I
would continue to do so. 2
46
Two years later, when his fears that a majority of the Court was
bent on establishing a new test for the admissibility of confessions had
proven well-founded, Justice White observed:
Today's result would not follow even if it were agreed that to some
extent custodial interrogation is inherently coercive. The [volunta-
riness] test has been whether the totality of circumstances deprived
the defendant of a "free choice to admit, to deny, or to refuse to
answer". ... The duration and nature of incommunicado custody,
the presence or absence of advice concerning the defendant's con-
stitutional rights, and the granting or refusal of requests to commu-
nicate with lawyers, relatives or friends have all been rightly
regarded as important data bearing on the basic inquiry.24 7
The author of the Miranda opinion was also aware of the nature
and scope of the voluntariness test. One week after Miranda, in the
course of declining to apply Escobedo or Miranda retroactively, but only
to trials begun after these decisions were announced, Chief Justice
Warren observed for a 7-2 majority:
[O]ur case law on coerced confessions is available for persons
whose trials have already been completed .... Prisoners may in-
voke a substantive test of voluntariness which, because of the persis-
tence of abusive practices, has become increasingly meticulous
through the years. That test now takes specific account of the failure
to advise the accused of his privilege against self-incrimination or to
allow him access to outside assistance. 248
The very same day, applying the voluntariness test to a case tried
before Escobedo or Miranda, the Court, again speaking through Chief
Justice Warren, made plain that the failure to advise a suspect of his
rights had a significant impact on the voluntariness of his confession.
In granting habeas corpus relief to a prisoner who had not been ad-
vised of his rights until after he had confessed orally on the sixteenth
day of his detention, the Court, per Chief Justice Warren, noted that
"[h]ad the trial in this case before us come after our decision in Mi-
randa, we would reverse summarily." 249 But that was not the end of
the story:
246 Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 499 (1964) (White, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted).
247 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 534 (White, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
248 Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966) (citations omitted); see also id. at
731 ("[Plast decisions treated the failure to warn accused persons of their rights, or the
failure to grant them access to outside assistance, as factors tending to prove the involunta-
riness of the resulting confessions.") (citations omitted).
249 Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737, 739 (1966).
931
CORNELL LAW REVEW
The review of voluntariness in cases in which the trial was held prior
to our decisions in Escobedo and Miranda is not limited in any man-
ner by these decisions. On the contrary, that a defendant was not
advised of his right to remain silent or of his right respecting coun-
sel at the outset of interrogation, as is now required by Miranda, is a
significant factor in considering the voluntariness of statements later
made. This factor has been recognized in several of our prior deci-
sions dealing with standards of voluntariness. Thus, the fact that
Davis was never effectively advised of his rights gives added weight to
the other circumstances [which] made his confession
involuntary. 25 0
In its arnicus brief partially supporting the defendant's petition
for certiorari in the Dickerson case, the Washington Legal Foundation
(WLF) notes that § 3501 requires the trial judge "to consider, not as
the sole factor but as a prominent one, whether the warnings were
given."251 However, as the pre-Miranda voluntariness test became "in-
creasingly meticulous through the years," 252 the failure to warn a sus-
pect of his right to remain silent and his right to counsel had become
increasingly prominent factors in the application of the voluntariness
test.253 As the author of the most comprehensive study of the pre-
Miranda due process-voluntariness test has observed:
It is not surprising to find that the last strain of pre-Miranda Due
Process analysis focused upon such persistent concerns as the denial
of access to counsel, and the failure to give warnings about the privi-
lege. The Court had come to regard these police actions as coercive
per se; the Court also had come to view these actions as predictable
features of custodial interrogation.2 54
Perhaps anticipating the argument that Congress can no more
pass laws that "restrict, abrogate, or dilute" constitutional rights in the
federal courts than it can when it exercises its powers under Section
Five of the Fourteenth Amendment to "enforce" the provisions of that
Amendment,255 the Washington Legal Foundation makes the bold
claim that § 3501-
250 Id. at 740-41 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
251 Brief for Amicus Curiae Washington Legal Foundation in Partial Support of Peti-
tioner on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
at 11, 120 S. Ct. 275 (1999) (No. 99-5823) [hereinafter Washington Legal Foundation
Brief].
252 Johnson, 384 U.S. at 731; see also Miranda, 384 U.S. at 508 (Harlan, J., dissenting)
("[S]ynopsis of the uses [applying the due process-voluntariness test] would serve little
use because the overall gauge has been steadily changing, usually in the direction of re-
stricting admissibility.").
253 See supra text accompanying notes 249-50.
254 Hancock, supra note 160, at 2235-36.
255 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. In Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966), the
Court, through Justice Brennan, "emphasize[d] that Congress' power under § 5 is limited
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does not simply restore the legal status quo ante but goes signifi-
cantly beyond pre-Miranda voluntariness law... The statute directs
the district court to consider whether the "defendant knew the na-
ture of the offense with which he was charged or of which he was
suspected at the time of the confession." [§ 3501(b) (2)]. This re-
quirement extends further than existing Miranda and Fifth Amend-
ment case law, which makes clear that such inquiry by the trial court
is not routinely required in order to assess the voluntariness of a
suspect's confession.2 56
Many commentators (and I am afraid I am one of them) have
talked about Miranda "discarding" or "supplanting" the voluntariness
test. This is not completely accurate. The Miranda court did find the
voluntariness test wanting, but it did not replace it in all settings and
under all circumstances. Miranda added another test. The voluntari-
ness test is still there.
If a custodial suspect effectively waives his Miranda rights and
agrees to talk to the police, but insists he is completely innocent, the
police do not have a free hand. They cannot subject the suspect to
many hours of relay interrogation, 257 nor strip off his clothes and
keep him naked for several hours,258 nor pretend to bring in the sus-
pect's ailing wife for questioning unless he agrees to cooperate. 259
Furthermore, if a suspect confesses to the police under circumstances
in which the officer is not required to give the Miranda warnings, e.g.,
the individual is not in custody, the suspect may still contend that the
confession was obtained involuntarily. In other words, just as the po-
lice may satisfy the voluntariness test, but violate Miranda, so may they
meet Miranda's requirements or have no need to comply with Miranda
yet fail the voluntariness test.
The question, then, is not whether § 3501 goes beyond Miranda
in some respects. Rather it is whether, in protecting the rights of cus-
todial suspects, the statute goes beyond the voluntariness test. It is
hard to see how § 3501 (b) (2) does-how the specification of any par-
ticular surrounding circumstance "goes significantly beyond pre-Mi-
randa voluntariness law," as the Washington Legal Foundation
claims26 0-when, in applying the voluntariness test, "the Court has as-
sessed the totality of all the surrounding circumstances." 26 1
to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the Amendment; § 5 grants Congress
no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute these guarantees." Id. at 651 n.10.
256 Washington Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 251, at 11-12 (citation omitted).
257 See supra text accompanying notes 164-65.
258 See Malinski v. New York, 324 U.S. 401 (1945).
259 See Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
260 See Washington Legal Foundation Brief, supra note 251, at 11-12; see also supra text
accompanying note 256.
261 Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973) (emphasis added). I do not
find persuasive the argument that specifically enumerating one or more surrounding cir-
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To be sure, in noting the oppressive or offensive circumstances
surrounding the confession the Court seldom pointed to the failure of
the defendant to know the nature of the offense with which he was
charged or of which he was suspected.262 The Court was too busy call-
ing attention to other "surrounding circumstances" which it found
more disturbing--threats of violence, physical deprivation such as
lack of sleep or food, persistent and prolonged questioning, the re-
fusal of requests to communicate with lawyers or relatives, the failure
to advise the suspect of the right to remain silent or the right to con-
sult with counsel, and the violation of state laws requiring that ar-
rested persons be promptly brought before a magistrate. 263
As we have seen,264 the WLF relies on Colorado v. Spring for the
proposition that a suspect's knowledge of the offense with which he is
charged had not been one of the circumstances to be considered in
determining the voluntariness of a confession. However, I think the
WLF is confusing Miranda with the voluntariness test. On the page of
the opinion the WLF cites, the Spring Court is only discussing Miranda:
The failure of law enforcement officers to inform a custodial subject
of the subject matter of the interrogation is not a violation of anything
required by Miranda and "could affect only the wisdom of a Miranda
waiver, not its essentially voluntary and knowing nature"; thus it
"could not affect Spring's decision to waive his Fifth Amendment priv-
ilege in a constitutionally significant manner."2 65
cumstances in a statute gives these circumstances more significance or more weight. Does
it then follow that the failure to single out other circumstances make them less significant
or entitle them to less weight? Why is violence or the threat of it; or physical deprivation,
such as the lack of sleep; or persistent and prolonged questioning not specifically men-
tioned in § 3501? Under the statute, are these factors now less significant or entitled to less
weight than the failure to notify the suspect of the charge against him?
262 But see Harris v. South Carolina, 338 U.S. 68, 69 (1949) (holding that the defen-
dant's confession was involuntarily obtained and noting that " [n] o warrant was read to him
and he was not informed of the charge against him"). The Court also pointed out that the
defendant first learned that he was suspected of murdering a certain person three days
after he was taken into custody. See id.; see also Gallegos v. Nebraska, 342 U.S. 55, 65 (1951)
(plurality opinion).
263 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 226 (1973); Culombe v. Con-
necticut, 367 U.S. 568, 601-02, 629-31 (1961); Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 442-44 (1961);
Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62, 64 (1948).
264 See supra text accompanying note 256.
265 Colorado v. Springs, 479 U.S. 564, 577 (1987). However, at another page, id. at
574, one not cited by the WLF, the Spring Court observes that the failure to inform a
suspect of the subject matter of the interrogation "does not relate to any of the traditional
indicia of coercion," and then quotes a short summary by justice Frankfurter of the kinds
of circumstances that go into an assessment of voluntariness, a summary that omits the
failure to inform a suspect of the crime for which he is changed and a number of otherfactors.
Id. As pointed out earlier, because it ranks well below many other circumstances surround-
ing the obtaining of a confession-both in terms of coercion and offensiveness-the fail-
ure to inform a suspect of the subject matter of the interrogation is not likely to make any
short list of factors to be taken into account. See supra text accompanying note 261.
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In an article he wrote thirty years ago, Professor Burt provides
some support for the WLF's position:
[Section 3501] does not wholly sweep aside Miranda and its immedi-
ate ancestor Escobedo v. Illinois, to restore pristine the prior federal
law. In particular, [§ 3501] explicitly recognizes that "prior to ques-
tioning" there is "a right to the assistance of counsel," a right that
was not clearly established until Escobedo.2 66
I venture to say that Professor Burt is assigning too much signifi-
cance to the phrase "a right to the assistance of counsel." By listing
whether or not a suspect was advised of "his right to the assistance of
counsel" as a relevant factor-but not a determinative one-§ 3501 is
not recognizing or establishing a right to counsel in the Escobedo sense.
In Haynes v. Washington,267 the last of the pre-Escobedo, pre-Mi-
randa confession cases, the Court pointed out that nothing in the rec-
ord indicated that prior to signing the confession "Haynes was advised
by the authorities of his right to remain silent... or told of his rights
respecting consultation with a lawyer."268 But this was a year before
Escobedo established the "right to counsel" in the stationhouse and
three years before Miranda established the "right" to remain silent in
the same place.
When it came to confessions, Justice Jackson was probably the
most police-oriented Justice of his day. (It will be recalled that he
wrote a strong dissent in the Asheraft case.2 69 ) Yet he used "right to
counsel" language as far back as 1949. That year Jackson noted that
one factor stood out in the three confession cases then before the
Court-" [t]he suspect neither had nor was advised of his right to get
counsel."270 SurelyJustice Jackson did not mean-fifteen years before
Moreover, the summary of voluntariness factors composed by Justice Frankfurter in
Culombev. Connecticut 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961), and quoted by the SpringCourt, is immedi-
ately preceded in Culombe by a discussion of whether any factor (such as the failure to
caution a prisoner or refusal to permit communication with counsel) constitutes a "single
litmus-paper test for constitutionally impermissible interrogation." Id. at 601. After an-
swering in the negative, Justice Frankfurter continues "Each of these factors, in company
with all of the surrounding circumstances ... is relevant." Id. at 602 (emphasis added).
Finally, it should be noted that writing for the majority in Reck v. Pate, 367 U.S. 433, 440
(1961), a case handed down only one week before Culombe, Justice Stewart observed that
"[i]n resolving the ['voluntariness'] issue all the circumstances attendant upon the confes-
sion must be taken into account." Id. (emphasis added).
266 Burt, supra note 71, at 129.
267 373 U.S. 504 (1973).
268 Id. at 510.
269 See supra text accompanying notes 164-69.
270 Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 57, 59 (1948) (Jackson, J., concurring in the result)
(emphasis added). Justice Jackson's concurring opinion in Watts also constituted his dis-
senting opinions in Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949), and Haris v. South Carolina,
338 U.S. 68 (1949).
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Escobedo--that a suspect had a right to counsel in the sense that any
violation of it rendered a resulting confession inadmissible. 27'
Justice Frankfurter, author of the principal opinions in the three
cases Justice Jackson was discussing, noted that in one of the cases,
during the entire period of interrogation the defendant was "without
advice as to his constitutional rights."272 In context, this could only
have meant the right to counsel and the right to remain silent. In a
companion confession case, Justice Frankfurter pointed out that the
defendant "was not informed of his right to remain silent" until after
he had confessed. 273 SurelyJustice Frankfurter was not saying-seven-
teen years before Miranda-that a suspect had a "right" to remain si-
lent in the sense that a failure to know of or to be advised of such a
right barred the use of any resulting confession.2 74
Still another argument in favor of § 3501 needs to be considered,
the best one, I think, proponents of the statute have. This is an argu-
ment based on how the post-Warren Court has characterized Miranda,
first in Michigan v. Tucker,275 and then in New York v. Quarles2 76 and
Oregon v. Elstad 2 77
C. The Implications of the Tucker-Quarles-Elstad Way of Thinking
about Miranda
Tucker was a mild case of police misconduct-a very appealing
case from the point of view of the prosecution. First of all, the defen-
dant has been questioned and had confessed before Miranda was de-
cided, although his trial took place afterward. Thus, Miranda was just
barely applicable.2 78 Second, Tucker did not deal with the admissibility
of the defendant's own statements-they had been excluded-but
271 A decade after Justice Jackson referred to a suspect's "right to get counsel," the
Court upheld the admissibility of a confession even though the police had repeatedly de-
nied the suspect's requests to contact a specific attorney. See Crooker v. California, 357
U.S. 445 (1958). For a discussion of Crookerand for the view that Haynes v. Washington, 373
U.S. 504 (1963), may have, in effect, overruled it, see Yale Kamisar, Remembering the "Old
World" of Criminal Procedure: A Reply to Professor Grano, 23 U. MIcH. J.L. REFORM 537, 569-75
(1990).
272 Watts, 338 U.S. at 53 (emphasis added).
273 Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. at 64 (emphasis added).
274 In his long plurality opinion in Culombe v. Connecticu4 367 U.S. 568 (1961), an opin-
ion which Chief Justice Warren, concurring, called a "dissertation" on the voluntariness
test, id. at 635, Justice Frankfurter observed that "even to inform the suspect of his legal
right to keep silent will prove an obstruction," id& at 580 (emphasis added); that "[t] here is
no indication that at any time Culombe was warned of his right to keep silent," id. at 609-10
(emphasis added); and that Culombe "was apparently never informed of his constitutional
rights." Id. at 630 (emphasis added). But Culombe was decided five years before Miranda
275 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
276 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
277 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
278 In Johnson v. NewJersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966), the Court held that Miranda affected
only those cases in which the trial began after that decision. See supra text accompanying
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only with the testimony of a witness whose identity had been discov-
ered by questioning the suspect without giving him a complete set of
Miranda warnings.
Only one member of the Court, Justice Douglas, dissented in
Tucker.279 Justice White concurred in the result on the ground that
Miranda did not deal with the testimony of witnesses derived from
statements obtained in violation of that case and he would not extend
it that far.280 Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall, also con-
curred in the result, maintaining that the rule applying Miranda to
trials begun after the date that decision had been announced should
not extend to derivative evidence but be confined to "those cases in
which the direct statements of an accused made during a pre-Miranda
interrogation were introduced at the post-Miranda trial."281
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Tucker was the opinion of the
Court only because Justice Stewartjoined it. But Stewart pointed out
that he "could also join" Justice Brennan's concurrence, for it struck
him that "despite differences in phraseology, and despite the disclaim-
ers of their respective authors," the two opinions "proceed along virtu-
ally parallel lines."28 2
Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Tucker explaining why, under the
circumstances, the witness's testimony was admissible can be read very
narrowly.2813 However, the opinion contains a good deal of broad and
(from the viewpoint of Miranda supporters, at any rate) mischievous
language.
The Tucker Court seemed to equate the compulsion barred by the
privilege against self-incrimination with coercion or involuntariness
under the pre-Miranda totality of circumstances-voluntariness test.284
This conflation is quite misleading. Much harsher police methods
were needed to render a confession coerced or involuntary under the
pre-Miranda test than are necessary to make a confession compelled
within the meaning of the self-incrimination clause. 28 5 That, at least,
note 248. The Court probably should have held that Miranda affected only those confes-
sions obtained after the date of the decision.
279 See 417 U.S. at 461 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
280 See id. at 460 (White, J., concurring).
281 Id. at 458 (Brennan, J., concurring).
282 Id. at 453 (Stewart, J., concurring).
283 For example, Justice Rehnquist "consider[ed] it significant to our decision in this
case that the officers' failure to advise [defendant] of his right to appointed counsel oc-
curred prior to the decision in Miranda." Id. at 447. Justice Rehnquist also reasoned that
since the statements made to the police by the defendant had been excluded at trial,
"[w]hatever deterrent effect on future police conduct the exclusion of those statements
may have had" would not be "significantly augmented by excluding the testimony of the
witness Henderson as well." Id. at 448.
284 See id. at 444-46.
285 See Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 440-46; Geoffrey R. Stone, The Miranda Doctrine in
the Burger Cour4 1977 Sup. CT. REv. 99, 118-19; see also Yale Kamisar, The "Police Practice"
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is the premise of Miranda. And that, at least, was the understanding of
everyone involved in the case. 286
The difficulties a defendant faced in establishing that his confes-
sion was coerced or involuntary was a principal reason the voluntari-
ness test for the admissibility of confessions was considered
inadequate. 287 That is why at the time law enforcement officials pre-
ferred the old test and resisted the application of the self-incrimina-
tion clause to custodial police interrogation. And that is why,
although his questioning had been quite mild compared to the op-
pressive and offensive police methods that had rendered statements
inadmissible in the cases applying the old voluntariness test, Ernesto
Miranda's confession was held inadmissible.
If Tuckers view of Miranda was correct-if a violation of Miranda
were a violation of the self-incrimination clause only if the confession
was involuntary under traditional standards288 then it is hard to see
what that landmark case would have accomplished by applying the
privilege against self-incrimination to the proceedings in the police
station. If the privilege were violated only when the confession was
deemed coerced or involuntary under the pre-Miranda test for the ad-
missibility of confessions, what was all the shouting about in Miranda?
Why did it matter whether the privilege applied to the police station?
There is an even more troubling aspect to Tucker. Justice Rehn-
quist told us that the Miranda Court had recognized that the Miranda
warnings "were not themselves rights protected by the Constitution,
but were instead measures to insure that the right against compulsory
Phases of the Criminal Process and the Three Phases of the Burger Court, in THE BURGERYEARS 143,
152-53 (Herman Schwartz ed., 1987).
286 Thus, dissenting Justice Harlan observed that "[h]aving decided that the Fifth
Amendment privilege does apply in the police station, the Court reveals that the privilege
imposes more exacting restrictions than does the Fourteenth Amendment's voluntariness
test." Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 511 (1966) (Harlan, J., dissenting). Indeed, one
reason proponents of § 3501 were so angry at the Miranda Court was that application of
the privilege to the police station could bar the use of statements that would have been
found voluntary, and thus admissible, under the pre-Miranda test See supra note 231.
287 As Stone points out:
[given the Court's inability to articulate a clear and predictable definition
of "voluntariness," the apparent persistentness of state courts in utilizing
the ambiguity of the concept to validate confessions of doubtful constitu-
tionality, and the resultant burden on its own workload, it seemed inevita-
ble that the Court would seek "some automatic device by which the
potential evils of incommunicado interrogation [could] be controlled."
Stone, supra note 285, at 102-03 (quoting WALTER ScHAEFER, THE SUSPEcr AND Socijr' 10
(1967)); see also Welsh S. White, What Is an Involuntary Confession Now?, 50 RuTGERs L. Rxv.
2001 (1998) (exploring how the standard of voluntariness in confessions has changed in
the last 30 years). See generally Hancock, supra note 160; KAmisAR, supra note 125, at 67-76;
StephenJ. Schulhofer, Confessions and the Cour 79 Mies-. L. REv. 865, 867-78 (1981) (essay
book review).
288 See Tucker, 417 U.S. at 444-45.
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self-incrimination was protected."28 9 Morever, added Justice Rehn-
quist, the Miranda Court advised us that the suggested safeguards-
what the Tucker opinion later calls the "prophylactic standards" laid
down in Miranda29 0-"were not intended to 'create a constitutional
straighJacket.' 29 1
Miranda tells us that the warnings need not be given if, but only
if, equally effective alternative safeguards are in place and it tells us
this four different times.292 Yet Tucker never refers to any of the lan-
guage in the Miranda opinion discussing the need for either the Mi-
randa warnings or other procedural safeguards that are "a fully
effective equivalent,"293 or "at least as effective,"' 29 4 or "fully as effective
as those described above."29 5
The language in Tucker has turned out to be quite significant. A
decade later, first in New York v. Quarles29 6 and then in Oregon v. El-
stad,2 9 7 the Court reiterated Tucke's way of looking at, and talking
about, Miranda. In both Quarles and Elstad, the Court underscored
the distinction between actual coercion by physical violence or threats
of violence and inherent or irrebutably presumed coercion (the basis for
the Miranda rules) and between statements that are actually "coerced"
or "compelled" and those obtained merely in violation of Miranda's
"procedural safeguards" or "prophylactic rules."298
289 Id. at 444.
290 See id. at 446-47.
291 Id. at 444 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 467 (1966)).
292 See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467, 476, 479, 490.
293 Id. at 476.
294 Id. at 467.
295 Id. at 490.
296 467 U.S. 649 (1984).
297 470 U.S. 298 (1985).
298 Quarles recognized a "public safety" exception to the Miranda warnings and thus
held both the suspect's statement, "the gun is over there," and the gun found as a result
admissible. Quarles, 467 U.S. at 657. Relying heavily on Tucker, the Quarks Court, perJus-
tice Rehnquist, concluded that "the need for answers to questions in a situation posing a
threat to the public safety outweighs the need for the prophylactic rule protecting the Fifth
Amendment's privilege against self-incrimination." Id. As pointed out in Weisselberg,
supra note 144, at 129 n.114, the Quarks Court's "cost-benefit analysis represents a wholly
different view of the value of the Fifth Amendment than was expressed in Miranda."
In Elstad, relying on the "fruit of the poisonous tree" doctrine, a rule first developed in
the search and seizure area, see Robert M. Pitier, "The Fruit ofthe Poisonous Tree"Revisited and
Shepardized, 56 C.- L. REV. 579 (1968), the defendant contended that his second confes-
sion, although immediately preceded by Miranda warnings and a valid waiver of rights,
should be excluded as the "fruit" of an earlier Miranda violation. Elstad, 470 U.S. at 303-06.
The Court, through Justice O'Connor, disagreed: The fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine
"assumes the existence of a constitutional violation," id. at 305, but in this case, as in Tucker,
"the breach of the Miranda procedures.., involved no actual compulsion." Id. at 308.
Furthermore, violations of "the prophylactic Miranda procedures ... should not breed the
same irremediable consequences as police infringement of the Fifth Amendment itself."
Id. at 309.
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Ironically, the language in the Miranda opinion that the post-
Warren Court used in Tucker and subsequent cases to deconstitution-
alize Miranda is language Chief'Justice Warren inserted at the sugges-
don of Justice Brennan. Commenting on an earlier draft of the
Miranda opinion, Justice Brennan wrote Warren:
[We are justified in policing interrogation practices only to the ex-
tent required to prevent denial of the right against compelled self-
incrimination as we defined that right in Malloy [v. Hogan]. I there-
fore do not think, as your draft seems to suggest, that there is only a
single constitutional solution to the problems of testimonial com-
pulsion inherent in custodial interrogation. I agree that, largely for
the reasons you have stated, all four cases must be reversed for lack
of any safeguards against denial of the right. I also agree that warn-
ings and the help of counsel are appropriate. But should we not
leave Congress and the States latitude to devise other means (if they
can) which might also create an interrogation climate which has the similar
effect of preventing the fettering of a person's own wil 299
Since police interrogation, as presently practiced, carries a sub-
stantial risk of testimonial compulsion and indeed is actually now
structured to accomplish this overbearing effect, the constitution re-
quires that both federal and state governments must incorporate
appropriate safeguarding procedures in their interrogation prac-
tices. And while no precise safeguards are required, none will be
deemed sufficient if any less effective than those provided by full warning of
rights to silence and counse scrupulously recorded and observed.300
Chief Justice Warren reworked the draft opinion of Miranda to
accommodate Justice Brennan's suggestions. As we have seen, the
new language caught the attention of Attorney General Mitchell's De-
partment of Justice in 1969.301
Portions of'Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Tucker are reminiscent
of the 1969 DOJ memorandum.3 0 2 As the Justice Department had
done five years earlier, Justice Rehnquist made a rather large leap.
Starting with the premise that the Miranda warnings "were not them-
selves rights protected by the Constitution"303 in the sense that alter-
native procedural safeguards established by a legislature might be
299 Brennan Letter, supra note 157, at 3 (emphasis added). For a discussion of, and
substantial extracts from, Justice Brennan's lengthy memorandum to the ChiefJustice, see
Weisselberg, supra note 144, at 123-25. In Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), the Court,
through Justice Brennan, told us that the Fifth Amendment privilege applies to the states
to its full extent and the voluntariness of a confession "is controlled by [the self-incrimina-
tion] portion of the Fifth Amendment." Id. at 7.
300 Brennan Letter, supra note 157, at 9 (emphasis added).
301 See supra text accompanying notes 216-30.
302 However, the DOJ memorandum was not cited in the opinion of the Court or in
any of the other four opinions or in any of the briefs.
303 Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444 (1974).
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equally effective-i.e., the Miranda safeguards were not intended to
"create a constitutional straightacket"304
-ustice Rehnquist con-
cluded that a failure to comply with the procedural rules or prophy-
lactic standards established in Miranda-even though no other
procedural safeguards to protect against inherent compulsion were in
place-does not constitute "compulsion sufficient to breach the right
against compulsory self-incrimination." 30 5 This, of course, is similar to
the 1969 Justice Department's argument that since the Miranda warn-
ings "are not themselves constitutional absolutes," Congress has the
power to declare by simple legislation that the absence of one or more
warnings does not necessarily require that any resulting confession be
excluded.30 6
To be sure, the Miranda warnings are not themselves "rights pro-
tected by the Constitution" or "constitutional absolutes" in the sense
that they are "changeable and contingent"3 07 -they may be replaced
by equally effective alternative safeguards-but absent the pre4interro-
gation warnings or any suitable substitute, statements taken from a
custodial suspect are, to cite the language in Miranda, "obtained from
the defendant under circumstances that [do] not meet constitutional
standards for protection of the privilege." 308
As Justice Rehnquist observed in Tucker, in order to "supplement
this new doctrine"3 9-the doctrine that "the self-incrimination clause
was applicable to state interrogations at a police station, and that a
defendant's statements might be excluded at trial despite their volun-
tary character under traditional principles"31 0-and in order "to help
police officers conduct interrogations without facing a continued risk
that valuable evidence would be lost, the Court in Miranda established
a set of specific guidelines, now commonly known as the Miranda
rules."31' But suppose that the Miranda Court had not "supple-
mented" its new doctrine-had not established a set of specific guide-
lines to help the police conduct interrogations.
304 Id.
305 Id. at 445.
306 See supra text accompanying note 224.
307 Alschuler, supra note 138, at 2360 n.19.
308 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 491 (1966) (emphasis added). At this point,
after completing its long discussion of police interrogation and confessions generally, the
Court continued:
We turn now to [the facts of each case] to consider the application of the
constitutional principles discussed above. In each instance, we have con-
cluded that statements were obtained under circumstances that did not
meet constitutional standards for protection of the privilege.
Id. (emphasis added).
309 Tucker, 417 U.S. at 443.
310 Id.
311 Id.
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Suppose, instead, that after informing Congress and the states
that "[u]nless adequate protective devices are employed to dispel the
compulsion inherent in custodial surroundings, no statement ob-
tained from the defendant can truly be the product of his free
choice,"13 2 the Miranda Court had stopped right there. Suppose it had
simply left it up to Congress and the states-"in the exercise of their
creative rule-making capacities"-to develop their own procedural
safeguards for protecting the privilege against self-incrimination dur-
ing custodial interrogation.313 And suppose, finally, that, instead of
responding to the Court's invitation, Congress had simply enacted leg-
islation purporting to "overrule" Miranda. Would such legislation,
under such circumstances, be valid?
In answering the question I find Professor Stephen Schulhofer's
comments quite helpful. After pointing out that "[t]alk about 'over-
ruling' Miranda usually obscures the fact that Miranda contains not
one holding but a complex series of holdings,"3 14 Schulhofer points
out that "three conceptually distinct steps were involved in the Court's
decision":315 (1) informal pressure to speak "can constitute 'compul-
sion' within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment";3 16 (2) this ele-
ment of informal compulsion is present in custodial interrogation;3 17
and (3) the now-familiar warnings (or some equally effective alterna-
tive) "are required to dispel the compelling pressure of custodial in-
terrogation."318 "[T]he core of Miranda," maintains Schulhofer, "is
located in the first two steps."319
If the Miranda Court had not prescribed the four warnings, but
simply left it up to Congress and the States to devise acceptable proce-
dural safeguards, critics of Miranda would not have had the prophylac-
tic Miranda warnings to kick around anymore. In that event, I doubt
that anybody would seriously argue that Congress could overturn Mi-
randa by simple legislation.
But why should what might be called the penultimate holding of
Miranda be subject to overruling by simple legislation because the ulti-
312 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 458.
313 Cf id. at 467 ("[ilt is impossible for us to foresee the potential alternatives for
protecting the privilege which might be devised by Congress or the States in the exercise of
their creative rule-making capacities"). The Miranda court went on to state that "the Con-
stitution does not require any specific code of procedures for protecting the privilege
against self-incrimination during custodial interrogation," and, "Congress and the States
are free to develop their own safeguards... so long as they are fully as effective as those
described above...." Id. at 490.
314 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 436.
315 Id.; see also Weisselberg, supra note 144, at 112.
316 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 436.
317 See id.
318 Id.
319 Id.
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mate holding is prophylactic? Section 3501 also purports to "over-
rule" Escobedo. To be sure, Escobedo is no longer "good law,"320 but it
was thought to be good law when § 3501 was enacted. If Escobedo were
still viable, would it have been protected from legislative overruling
because it declined to establish any concrete guidelines-leaving
many police, prosecutors, and lower court judges bewildered?32' Is
Miranda, on the other hand, vulnerable to legislative overruling be-
cause it took pains to tell law enforcement officials how they could
continue questioning custodial suspects instead of leaving them "to
guess about what countermeasures would keep police on the safe side
of the constitutional line"?322
Allow me to make my point another way, by changing the facts in
Furman v. Georgia.3 23 As we all know, none of the five Justices who
wrote separate opinions invalidating the death penalty as it was then
administered told Congress and the states precisely how they could
satisfy the Court's concerns that the death penalty not be imposed in
an arbitrary or capricious manner. But suppose they had. Suppose
the 5-4 majority in Furman had told us that it could not say that the
Constitution requires adherence to any particular solution, but unless
shown other procedures which are at least as effective, adoption of the
Model Penal Code's alternative provision on capital punishment
would pass muster under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. 324
The Model Code provision would then be a prophylactic rule.
But surely the fact that this aspect of Furman was prophylactic-that it
was not constitutional in character in the sense that alternative proce-
dural safeguards might be available-would not permit Congress to
reject the Model Code provision, establish no alternative procedures
either, yet overturn Furman lock, stock, and barrel. But is this not
essentially what Congress did to Miranda when it enacted § 3501?
Professor Henry Monaghan's article on the Court's power to fash-
ion "constitutional common law"325 has created considerable interest
and evoked strong criticism. 3 26 But assuming arguendo that he is
320 See supra note 3.
321 See id.
322 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 454. As Professor Schulhofer points out, in TuckerJus-
tice Rehnquist recognized that Miranda "established a set of specific protective guidelines,
now commonly known as the Miranda rules," in order "to help police officers conduct
interrogations without facing a continued risk that valuable evidence would be lost." Mich-
igan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 443 (1974); see Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 454.
323 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam); Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 454; see also supra
notes 187-97.
324 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (1962).
325 Henry P. Monaghan, Foreword: Constitutional Common Law, 89 H.uv. L. REv. 1
(1975).
326 See Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional Common
Law, 91 HAIv. L. REv. 1117 (1978); see also Thomas S. Schrock, Robert C. Welsh, & Ronald
Collins, Interrogational Rights: Reflections on Miranda v. Arizona, 52 So. CAL. L. REv. 1 (1978).
943
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
right and that the Miranda rules constitute "constitutional common
law"-"rules drawing their inspiration and authority from, but not re-
quired by, various constitutional provisions"327 -this is surely not true
of Miranda's first two holdings. These holdings, to use Professor
Monaghan's terminology, constitute "Marburyshielded constitutional
exegesis."3 28
Monaghan tells us that, unlike constitutional common law, "a
holding that the constitutionally-based freedom from unreasonable
searches and seizures embraces electronic eavesdropping, whether
correct or not on the merits, constitutes an interpretative filling-out of
the underlying constitutional guarantee." 329 But this is no less true of
a holding-and this happens to be one of Miranda's holdings-that
the constitutionally-based privilege against self-incrimination em-
braces police interrogation in the stationhouse. Whether correct or
not on the merits, this, too, is plainly "an interpretative filling-out of
the underlying constitutional guarantee."330
That the Miranda warnings are an exercise of "the Supreme
Court's power to fashion constitutional common law,"33' that they are
"constitutionally inspired implementing rules"33 2 rather than what
might be called true, or Marbury-shielded, constitutional law, does not,
Professor Monaghan would agree, make them any less legitimate or
useful.
The privilege against self-incrimination, along with other consti-
tutional guarantees, needs "breathing space."3 33 What the Miranda
Court did, I think it fair to say, was to try to assure that no confession
actually compelled would be admitted into evidence. It did so by es-
tablishing conclusive presumptions and related forms of prophylactic
rules to implement or to reinforce the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion-in order to guard against actual constitutional violations. Is this
improper?
Yes, answers Professor Joseph Grano, for many years (until the
compelling presence on the scene of Professor Paul Cassell)3 34 the
327 Monaghan, supra note 325, at 3.
328 Id. at 31.
329 Id. at 23.
330 Id
331 Id. at 19.
332 Id.
333 Cf. Weatherford v. Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 565 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
334 See Paul G. Cassell, Miranda's "Negligible" Effect on Law Enforcement: Some Skeptical
Observations, 20 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 327 (1997); Paul G. Cassell, Protecting the Innocent
from False Confessions and Lost Confessions-and from Miranda, 88 J. Ciam. L. & CRIMINOLOcY
497 (1998); Paul G. Cassell, The Statute that Time Forgot: 18 U.S.C. § 3501 and the Overhauling
of Miranda, 85 IowA L. Rv. 175 (1999); Cassell, supra note 142, at 387; Paul G. Cassell &
Richard Fowles, Handcuffing the Caps? A Thirly-year Perspective and Miranda's Harmful Effects
on Law Enforcemen4 50 STAN. L. R.Ev. 1055 (1998).
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nation's leading critic of Miranda. As the Court now characterizes
what it did in Miranda, contends Professor Grano, that case is an ille-
gitimate decision. 335 To permit federal courts to impose on the states
prophylactic rules, i.e., rules that may be violated without violating the
Constitution itself, maintains Grano, is "to say in essence that federal
courts have supervisory power over state courts." 336 According to
Grano, the Court lacks constitutional authority to overturn state con-
victions "absent an actual violation of either the Constitution or some
other valid federal law."3 37
For the reasons advanced by Stephen Schulhofer and David
Strauss, I strongly disagree. "A conclusive presumption of compul-
sion," writes Professor Schulhofer, "is in fact a responsible reaction to
the problems of the voluntariness test, to the rarity of cases in which
compelling pressures are truly absent, and to the adjudicatory costs of
case-by-case decisions in this area."338 More generally, as Professor
Strauss maintains, "it makes much more sense to read into the Consti-
tution a general requirement that its various provisions be interpreted
in light of institutional realities than to insist that these realities be
ignored."339
Suppose Miranda had established a rebuttable presumption that
any incriminating statement obtained in a custodial setting in the ab-
sence of Miranda safeguards (or equally effective procedures) is com-
pelled, but that this presumption could be overcome if the suspect
were a police officer, lawyer, or law student. Such a presumption
would produce the same result a conclusive presumption would in at
least ninety-five percent of the cases. But so far as I know everybody
agrees that a court's responsibility to achieve accurate fact finding per-
mits it to assign burdens of proof and to adopt rebuttable presump-
tions. As Professor Strauss argues, if it is legitimate for a court to
decide that evidence of voluntariness is legally immaterial in some
cases (where the evidence is insufficient to overcome a rebuttable pre-
sumption), why should it be-how can it be-improper for a court to
extend that approach to all cases?34°
335 See GRANo, supra note 170, at 174,185-98. In his book Professor Grano draws upon
and elaborates on arguments he made in a number of earlier articles. See, e.g., Joseph D.
Grano, Miranda v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Rea-
son, 24 Am. CRm. L. Ray. 243 (1986); Joseph D. Grano, Miranda's Constitutional Difficulties:
A Reply to Professor Schulhofer, 55 U. CHI. L. Ray. 174 (1988); Joseph D. Grano, Prophylactic
Rules in Criminal Procedure: A Question of Article III Legitimacy, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 100 (1985).
336 GRANo, supra note 170, at 191.
337 Id. at 183.
338 Schulhofer, supra note 4, at 453.
339 David A. Strauss, The Ubiquity of Prophylactic Rules, 55 U. CH. L. REv. 190, 208
(1988).
340 See id. at 194.
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Miranda is based on the realization that case-by-case determina-
tion and review of the voluntariness of a confession, in light of the
totality of the circumstances, was severely testing the capacity of the
judiciary and that institutional realities warranted a conclusive pre-
sumption that a confession obtained under certain conditions and in
the absence of certain safeguards was compelled. As Schulhofer and
Strauss maintain, under any plausible approach to constitutional in-
terpretation, courts must be allowed to take into account their fact-
finding limitations.
Miranda was not the first confession case in which the Court pre-
scribed prophylactic procedures to protect or implement an underly-
ing constitutional right. Recall Jackson v. Denno.3 41
Under the New York procedures invalidated in Jackson, the deter-
mination of a confession's voluntary character, as well as its truthful-
ness, was usually left to the jury. Because the New York procedure
"did not afford a reliable determination of the voluntariness of the
confession offered in evidence" 342 and thus "did not adequately pro-
tect Jackson's right to be free of a conviction based upon a coerced
confession," 343 the Court ruled that the procedure violated Four-
teenth Amendment due process. As Justice White observed for the
majority:
The danger that matters pertaining to the defendant's guilt will in-
fect the jury's findings of fact bearing upon voluntariness, as well as
its conclusion upon that issue itself, is sufficiently serious to pre-
clude their unqualified acceptance upon review in this Court, re-
gardless of whether there is or is not sufficient other evidence to
sustain a finding of guilt.a 44
* **
The admixture of reliability and voluntariness in the considerations
of the jury would itself entitle a defendant to further proceedings in
any case in which the essential facts are disputed, for we cannot
determine how the jury resolved these issues and will not assume
that they were reliably and properly resolved against the accused.
And it is only a reliable determination on the voluntariness issue
which satisfies the constitutional rights of the defendant .... 345
It strikes me that what the Court did in Jackson v. Denno is essen-
tially no different than what it did in Miranda.
The Jackson ruling, no less than Miranda, protects or provides
safeguards for the constitutional guarantee (in Jackson, the Fourteenth
341 378 U.S. 368 (1964). For a brief discussion of, and extracts from, Jacksn, see supra
text accompanying notes 202-07.
342 Jackson, 378 U.S. at 377.
343 Id.
344 Id. at 383.
345 Id. at 387.
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Amendment Due Process prohibition against the use of coerced con-
fessions) and "sweeps more broadly" than the constitutional guaran-
tee itself.3 46 The Jackson Court did not say that under the New York
procedures a defendant never received a fair and clear-cut determina-
tion that the confession used against him was in fact voluntary. Nor
did it even say that under such a procedure a defendant failed to re-
ceive such a determination more often than not.
The Court only told us that the New York procedure "poses sub-
stantial threats to a defendant's constitutional rights to have an invol-
untary confession entirely disregarded and to have the coercion issue
fairly and reliably determined."347 The Court only told us that unless
the "voluntariness" of a defendant's confession were "determined in a
proceeding separate and apart from the body trying guilt or inno-
cence,"348 it could not be confident that a defendant had received "a
reliable and clear-cut determination" of the issue.349
I do not think there is much distance between Jackson and Mi-
randa. If the Court may prescribe procedures to ensure that the con-
clusion a confession is voluntary is not reached for improper reasons,
why can it not prescribe procedures to ensure that a custodial suspect
does not confess for improper reasons? Because he believes that po-
lice have a right to an answer? Or that his silence will be used against
him? Or because he thinks he has no right to counsel in the police
station?
Surely, police interrogation, as generally practiced at the time Mi-
randa was decided, "[p]osed substantial threats" to a defendant's Fifth
Amendment rights350 -a significant danger that a custodial suspect
might make incriminating statements to the police because he misun-
derstood his rights, or because he did not realize he had any rights, or
was led to believe he did not have any. Would not one obvious way to
take proper account of these dangers-to ensure a reliable determina-
tion that a custodial suspect was not compelled to speak within the
meaning of the self-incrimination clause-be to require the police to
inform a custodial suspect of his rights?
If the Jackson Court could take steps to ensure that the voluntari-
ness question was "fairly and reliably determined," why could the Mi-
randa Court not take steps to ensure that the question why the suspect
spoke to the police-what induced him to do so-be resolved fairly
and reliably? Did the suspect incriminate himself because he wanted
346 Cf Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 306 (1985) ("The Miranda exclusionary rule...
serves the Fifth Amendment and sweeps more broadly than the Fifth Amendment itself.").
347 Jackson, 378 U.S. at 389.
348 Id. at 394.
349 Id. at 391.
350 Id. at 389.
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to "get it off his chest"? Or because he thought he could match wits
with the police? Or did he talk to the police because he thought he
had to do so or that it would be so much the worse for him if he did
not? How else could one resolve this question fairly and reliably un-
less one required the police to advise a custodial suspect of his rights?
Jackson v. Denno is not the only confession case other than Mi-
randa to prescribe prophylactic rules. Maine v. Moulton did so as
well.351 The Massiah doctrine holds that once formal charges have
been fied against an individual the right to counsel has "attached,"
i.e., the individual has a right to counsel when the government delib-
erately elicits incriminating statements from him. 352 But law enforce-
ment officers have the right, if not the duty, to continue to investigate
the individual for reasons unrelated to the gathering of evidence con-
cerning charges to which the right to counsel has attached.353 For
example, if there are reports that an indicted person plans to harm a
witness or bribe a juror, the government can continue to investigate
those matters.
The trouble is that law enforcement officials investigating an indi-
vidual suspected of committing, or about to commit, a new crime and
formally charged with having committed another one "obviously seek
to discover evidence useful at a trial of either crime. '3 54 The Court's
"sensible solution" to the problem 355 was to establish a rule barring
incriminating statements pertaining to pending charges "notwith-
standing the fact that the police were also investigating other crimes,
if, in obtaining the evidence, the State violated the Sixth Amendment
by knowingly circumventing the accused's right to the assistance of
counsel."356 Explained Justice Brennan, for a 5-4 majority:
To allow the admission of evidence obtained from the accused in
violation of his Sixth Amendment rights whenever the police assert
an alternative, legitimate reason for their surveillance [in this case,
to insure the safety of their undercover agent and to procure infor-
mation concerning a report that defendant was planning to kill a
witness] invites abuse by law enforcement personnel in the form of
fabricated investigations and risks the evisceration of the Sixth
Amendment right recognized in Massiah. On the other hand, to
exclude evidence pertaining to charges as to which the Sixth
Amendment right to counsel had not attached at the time the evi-
dence was obtained, simply because other charges were pending at
351 474 U.S. 159 (1985).
352 Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964).
353 See Moulton, 474 U.S. at 178-179.
354 Id. at 179.
355 See id.
356 Id. at 180.
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that time, would unnecessarily frustrate the public's interest in the
investigation of criminal activities. 357
Thus, despite the fact the trial judge found that the police had
obtained statements from Mr. Moulton "for legitimate purposes not
related to the gathering of evidence concerning the crime for which
[he] had been indicted, 358 the Court excluded incriminating state-
ments pertaining to pending charges against Moulton.
The Moulton case, point out Professors Wayne LaFave, Jerold
Israel, and Nancy King in the new edition of their treatise, "illustrates
the potential for use of a prophylactic remedial measure to respond to
situations in which a violation has not necessarily occurred, but the
adjudicatory process would face significant obstacles in determining
whether it had occurred. '359 Thus, Moulton, like Miranda, "sweeps
more broadly than the constitutional guarantee itself. '360
A final word about establishing conclusive presumptions and
promulgating other kinds of prophylactic rules. If, as Professor Grano
has maintained, the Warren Court exceeded its constitutional author-
ity in Miranda, then the Burger Court (in Edwards v. Arizona 61) and
the Rehnquist Court (in Arizona v. Roberson362 and Minnick v. Missis-
sipp3 63) aggravated this transgression.
Edwards held, in effect, that when a custodial suspect invokes his
right to counsel, thereby expressing his belief that he is incapable of
357 Id.
358 Id. at 192 (Burger, CJ., dissenting).
359 LAFAvE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 157, § 2.9(e), at 675. Consider, too, North Caro-
lina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969), a case that LaFave, Israel and King tell us has come to be
viewed, along with Miranda, as "paradigmatic of prophylactic decision making." Id at 676.
After a number of defendants had managed to overturn their convictions only to be
given a heavier sentence for the same crime when they were retried and reconvicted, there
was reason to think that in some of these cases, at least, sentencing judges were punishing
defendants for having succeeded in getting their first convictions set aside. Because the
existence of a retaliatory motivation would be "extremely difficult to prove in any individ-
ual case," id. at 725 n.20, the Pearce Court established a presumption of vindictiveness.
Absent a showing that the heavier sentence upon retrial wvas based on specific conduct on
the part of defendant occurring after the time of the first sentence, vindictiveness against
the defendant for having successfully attacked his first conviction was presumed and the
sentence he received on retrial deemed violative of due process. See id.
Four years after Pearce was decided, in Michigan v. Payne 412 U.S. 47, 53 (1973), the
Court explained and defended "the Pearce prophylactic rules" by analogizing them to the
Miranda rules. "[T] he prophylactic rules in Pearce and Miranda are similar," the Court told
us, "in that each was designed to preserve the integrity of a phase of the criminal process."
Id. at 53.
I have discussed the Pearce case and its progeny at some length elsewhere. See Yale
Kamisar, Confessions, Search and Seizure and the Rehnquist Cour 34 TuLSA LJ. 465, 472-73
(1999); see also LAFAvE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 157, at 676-78.
360 See supra note 346 and accompanying text.
361 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
362 486 U.S. 675 (1988).
363 498 U.S. 146 (1990).
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undergoing police questioning without legal assistance, there is a con-
clusive presumption that any subsequent waiver of rights that comes at
police instigation, not at the suspect's own behest, is compelled.3 64 In
Roberson, which reaffirmed and extended the Edwards rule, the Court
spoke approvingly of "the bight-line prophylactic Edwards rule,"3 65
pointing out that "[wie have repeatedly emphasized the virtues of a
bright-line rule in cases following Edwards as well as Miranda."3 66
By holding that once a suspect invokes his right to a lawyer the
police may not reinitiate interrogation in the absence of counsel-
even if the suspect has been allowed to consult with an attorney in the
interim-Minnick made the Edwards rule more formidable still. In the
course of his majority opinion in Minnick, Justice Kennedy made a
comment about the Edwards rule that applies to Miranda as well:
"[The rule] ensures that any statement made in subsequent interroga-
tion is not the result of coercive pressures. Edwards conserves judicial
resources which would otherwise be expended in making difficult de-
terminations of voluntariness .... "367
Dissenting in Minnick, Justice Scalia (joined by the Chief'Justice)
protested that the Court's ruling "is the latest stage of prophylaxis
built on prophylaxis."368 As Justice Scalia described the Miranda-Ed-
wards line of cases: Minnick was a prophylactic rule needed to protect
Edwards which was a prophylactic rule needed to protect Miranda
which was a prophylactic rule "needed to protect the right against com-
pelled self-incrimination found (at last!) in the Constitution."369
Even though Justice Scalia left no doubt that he was unhappy
about the Court building prophylaxis upon prophylaxis, I think his
description of what the Court did in Edwards, Roberson, and Minnick is
accurate. If the Warren Court acted illegitimately in Miranda by estab-
lishing prophylactic rules, the Courts which succeeded it have been
repeat offenders.
III
SoME FrNAL THOUGHTS
The Court's characterization of Miranda in Tucker, Quarles, and
Elstad gives proponents of § 3501 an argument they did not make-
and they did not have-when the statute was debated and enacted
more than three decades ago. Nevertheless, I think proponents of
364 See Edwards, 451 U.S. at 484-85.
365 Roberson, 486 U.S. at 682.
366 Id. at 681.
367 Minnick, 498 U.S. at 151.
368 Id. at 166 (Scalia J. dissenting)
369 Id.
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§ 3501 overstate the significance of the prophylactic nature of the Mi-
randa warnings.
The specified procedures established in Miranda may be prophy-
lactic, but not the penultimate Miranda holding. I share Professor
Schulhofer's view that "[t]he crux of Miranda was not so much the
now-famous warnings but rather the Court's holding that 'all the prin-
ciples embodied in the [Fifth Amendment] privilege apply to infor-
mal compulsion exerted by law enforcement officers during in-
custody questioning .. '.. ,,,70 But § 3501 purports to overrule all of
Miranda, not just the prophylactic Miranda warnings.
I do not deny that the Miranda Court's recognition that Congress
could devise a suitable substitute for the now-familiar warnings "leaves
the door open for Congress to replace those rules with other safe-
guards that serve the same preventative function."371 I only contend
that Congress did not walk in the door. It chose not to replace the
Miranda warnings with a credible substitute. Instead, as I have main-
tained at considerable length, Congress contented itself with making
the pre-Miranda voluntariness test the sole test for the admissibility of
confessions. As Professor George Thomas has recently observed, "[i] t
would be paradoxical to permit a statutory version of voluntariness to
replace the Miranda presumption that the Court used to replace the
voluntariness test."372
Although Miranda has not fared well in the post-Warren Court
era,373 not all the opinions written in confession cases over the past
thirty years have saddened the hearts of Miranda's friends.
370 Schulhofer, supra note 287, at 878 (quoting Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 461
(1966)).
371 LAFAvE, ISRAEL & KING, supra note 157, § 2.9(e), at 674.
372 Statement of George Thomas III before the Subcommittee on Criminal Justice
Oversight of the U.S. Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning the Enforcement of
18 U.S.C. § 3501 (May 13, 1999), reprinted in YALE KAusAR, WAYNE R. LAFAvE, JEROLD H.
ISRAEL & NANcYJ. KING, 1999 SUPPLEMENT TO MODERN CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 25-26 (9th ed.
1999) [hereinafter Thomas, Statement].
373 In addition to Tucker, Quarles and Elstad, two impeachment cases, Harris v. New York,
401 U.S. 222 (1971), and Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714 (1975), are worthy of mention.
Harris, the first blow the Burger Court struck Miranda, held that statements preceded by
defective warnings, and thus inadmissible to establish the government's case-in-chief, could
nevertheless be used to impeach the defendant's credibility if she chose to take the stand
in her defense. See Harris, 401 U.S. at 225-26. The Court noted, but seemed unperturbed
by the fact, that the same language in the Miranda opinion could be read as barring the use
of statements obtained in violation of Miranda for any purpose. See id. at 224.
The Court went a step beyond Hanis in the second impeachment case, Hass. In this
case, after being advised of his rights, the suspect asserted his right to counsel. See Haas, 420
U.S. at 715. Nevertheless, the police refused to honor the request for a lawyer and contin-
ued to question the suspect See id. at 716. The Court ruled that here, too, the resulting
incriminating statements could be used for impeachment purposes. See id. at 722. Because
many suspects make incriminating statements even after the receipt of complete Miranda
warnings, Harris might have been explained-and contained-on the ground that permit-
ting impeachment use of statements required without complete warnings would not greatly
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The Edwards-Roberson-Minnick line of cases provides reason to be-
lieve that a majority of the Court is attracted to a rule that "conserves
judicial resources which would otherwise be expended in making diffi-
cult determinations of voluntariness." 374 Justice Scalia wrote a power-
ful dissent in Minnick, but it strikes me that the fact that only the Chief
Justice joined him underscores the significance of Justice Kennedy's
majority opinion.
Although the defendant lost in Moran v. Burbine,3 75 and not a few
civil libertarians were unhappy with the result,3 76 more important
than Burbines specific holding, I think, is the way the Burbine Court
looked back at Miranda. Justice O'Connor spoke for sixJustices when
she told us that Miranda "as written" struck the "proper balance" be-
tween law enforcement interests and a custodial suspect's Fifth
Amendment rights.377 She also viewed Miranda as a case that "embod-
ies a carefully crafted balance designed to fully protect both the defen-
dant's and society's interests."378  This is the way Miranda's
defenders-not its critics-have talked about the case for the past
three decades.
Withrow v. WilliamS3 79 had more nice things to say about Miranda
than any other case in the last three decades. What Withrow did is no
less significant than what it said about Miranda. As Professor Thomas
has observed, "Withrow is particularly noteworthy because it held that a
Miranda claim can be used in federal habeas to overturn a state con-
viction that had already survived direct appeal in state and federal
court."
3 8 0
encourage the police to violate Miranda. But in light of the Hass ruling, when suspects
assert their rights, the police seem to have very little to lose and much to gain by continuing
to question them in violation of Miranda.
The Court subsequently held that a defendant's prearrest silence could be used to
impeach him when he testified in his own defense, seeJenkins v. Anderson, 447 U.S. 231,
240 (1980), and then, so long as the police did not issue the Miranda warnings, that even a
defendant's postarrest silence could be used for impeachment purposes, see Fletcher v.
Weir, 455 U.S. 603 (1982). BothJenkins and Weir distinguished Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610
(1976), which deemed it a violation of due process to use a defendant's silence for im-
peachment purposes when the defendant remained silent after being given the Miranda
warnings. See Jenkins, 447 U.S. at 239-40; Weir, 455 U.S. at 605-06.
374 Minnick 498 U.S. at 151.
375 475 U.S. 412 (1986).
376 Burbine held that a confession preceded by an otherwise valid waiver of Miranda
rights by a suspect who had never asked anyone to get him a lawyer and did not know that
his sister had done so on her own initiative should not be excluded either (a) because the
police misled an inquiring attorney when they told her they were not going to question the
suspect she called about, or (b) because the police failed to inform the suspect of the
attorney's efforts to reach him. See id. at 422-23.
377 Id. at 424.
378 Id. at 433 n.4.
379 507 U.S. 680 (1993).
380 Thomas, Statement, supra note 372, at 25.
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The government argued in Withrow that since the Miranda rules
"are not constitutional in character, but merely 'prophylactic,"' fed-
eral habeas review should not extend to claims based on violations of
these rules.38 ' A majority of the Court accepted the government's
characterization of the Miranda safeguards, for purposes of the case,
but not the government's conclusion.
Justice Souter, who wrote the opinion of the Court in Withrow,
did not deny that "we have sometimes called the Miranda safeguards
'prophylactic' in nature"38 2 (because, explained Souter, violation of
these safeguards might lead to the exclusion of statements that would
not be found involuntary under pre-Miranda standards). But this, he
noted, is a "far cry" from putting Miranda in the same category as the
search and seizure exclusionary rule or from rendering Miranda sub-
ject to the same restrictions on the exercise of federal habeas jurisdic-
tion that apply to search and seizure cases.383
The Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, observed the Court,
cannot "be thought to enhance the soundness of the criminal process
by improving the reliability of evidence introduced at trial,"38 4 but Mi-
randa differs in this respect: "'Prophylactic' though it may be, in pro-
tecting a defendant's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, Miranda safeguards 'a fundamental trial right.' '3 85 It
"brace[s] against 'the possibility of unreliable statements in every in-
stance of in-custody interrogation,"' and thereby "serves to guard
against 'the use of unreliable statements at trial.' '38 6
If the Miranda warnings lacked a constitutional foundation, how
could the warnings be applied to the states on federal habeas review?
For that matter, how could Miranda continue to be applied to the
states on direct review? The Court has reminded us that its authority
with respect to state courts "is limited to enforcing the commands of
the U.S. Constitution. 387 Yet long after it handed down its opinion in
the Tucker case the Court has continued to overturn state convictions
because of Miranda violations.388 What the Court did in Miranda38 9
and what it has continued to do ever since seem to speak louder than
what the Court said about Miranda in Tucker and its progeny.
381 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 690.
382 Id.
383 Id. at 691.
384 Id.
385 Id. (quoting United States v. Verdugo-Viriquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 264 (1990)).
386 Withrow, 507 U.S. at 692 (quotingJohnson v. NewJersey, 384 U.S. 719, 730 (1966)).
387 Mu'Min v. Virginia, 500 U.S. 415, 422 (1991).
388 See, e.g., Minnick v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146 (1990); Arizona v. Roberson, 486 U.S.
675 (1988); Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477 (1981).
389 Three of the four cases the Court decided in Miranda were state cases.
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Dissenting from the Fourth Circuit's ruling in Dickerson in favor of
§ 3501,Judge Blaine Michael asked: "If Miranda is not a constitutional
rule, why does the Supreme Court continue to apply it to prosecutions
arising in state courts?"390 The Dickerson majority brushed this query
aside in a footnote, calling it "an interesting academic question."391 I
would call it a basic question, a practical question, and one that de-
serves an answer.
The Dickerson court spoke of "Congress's unquestioned power to
establish the rules of procedure and evidence in the federal
courts."3 92 But Congress can no more establish rules of evidence vio-
lating the Fifth Amendment than it can prescribe sentences for fed-
eral crimes that violate the Eighth Amendment.
In a sense, the Miranda rules are rules of evidence. But in a sense
so are many of the rules governing the admissibility of confessions-
the Massiah doctrine,39 3 Wong Sun,394 and the "voluntariness" test it-
self. But all the rules mentioned, as well as Miranda, are also rules of
constitutional dimension.
Could Congress abolish the Massiah doctrine in the federal
courts?395 When it became clear, as it did a number of years before
Escobedo and Miranda, that untrustworthiness was no longer the princi-
pal reason for excluding coerced or involuntary confessions, 396 could
Congress modify the voluntariness test in the federal courts by man-
dating the admissibility of coerced confessions when corroborated by
physical evidence?397
390 United States v. Dickerson, 166 F.3d 667, 697 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 120 S. Ct 275
(1999).
391 Id. at 691 n.21.
392 Id. at 692.
393 See supra discussion at note 5.
394 See id.
395 As noted earlier, see supra note 5, by declaring that voluntariness is the sole test for
the admissibility of confessions in the federal courts, § 3501 does literally overrule Massiah.
But so far as I know, nobody has taken this reading of § 3501 seriously.
396 The most emphatic articulation of this view maybe found in Rogers v. Richmond, 365
U.S. 534,540-44 (1961), but Rogers only "made certain what had been strongly intimated in
several earlier cases, such as Asheraft v. Tennessee [322 U.S. 143 (1944)] and Haley v. Ohio
[332 U.S. 596 (1948)], namely, that the due process exclusionary rule for confessions (in
much the same way as the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule for physical evidence) is
also intended to deter improper police conduct." LAFAVE, IsRAEL & KrNG, supra note 157,
§ 6.2(b), 2t 445. See generally Hancock, supra note 160; KAMsAR, supra note 163.
397 As the Court, through Justice Frankfurter, observed in Rogers.
[I]n many of the cases in which the command of the Due Process Clause
has compelled us to reverse state convictions involving the use of confes-
sions obtained by impermissible methods, independent corroborating evi-
dence left little doubt of the truth of what the defendant had confessed.
Despite such verification, confessions were found to be the product of con-
stitutionally impermissible methods in their inducement.
Rogers, 365 U.S. at 541.
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It is worth recalling whatJustice Frankfurter once said about the
rules of evidence governing the admissibility of confessions:
[B]ecause it is the courts which are charged, in the ultimate, both
with the enforcement of the criminal law and with safeguarding the
criminal defendant's rights to procedures consistent with funda-
mental fairness, the problem of reconciling society's need for police
interrogation with society's need for protection from the possible
abuses of police interrogation decisively devolves upon the courts,
particularly in connection with the rules of evidence which regulate
the admissibility of extrajudicial confessions.3 98
More is at stake in the Dickerson case than Miranda. What is also at
issue is the ability of the Court to interpret constitutional provisions in
light of institutional realities, to take into account its own fact-finding
limitations, and to utilize presumptions and prophylactic rules in or-
der to make constitutional rights more meaningful.
Although Boerne v. Rores399 involved the scope of Congress's en-
forcement power under section five of the Fourteenth Amendment
and Dickerson does not, what Justice Kennedy said for the Court in
Boerne about Congress "defin[ing] its own powers by altering the Four-
teenth Amendment's meaning" applies as well when Congress alters
the Fifth Amendment's meaning: If Congress could do so, "no longer
would the Constitution be 'superior paramount law unchangeable by
ordinary means.'" 400
How will it all end? Will Miranda survive or will § 3501 prevail?
When the Court provides the answer, hopefully it will quote the fol-
lowing passage from Boerne with approval:
When the political branches of the Government act against the
background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already
issued, it must be understood that in later cases and controversies
the Court will treat its precedents with the respect due them under
settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations
must be disappointed.401
398 Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 586-87 (1961) (plurality opinion).
399 521 U.S. 507 (1997).
400 Id. at 529 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
401 Id. at 536.
